Originally Posted by engineer (retard)
WEBF have you heard of Occams Razor?
"The razor states that one should proceed to simpler theories until simplicity can be traded for greater explanatory power. The simplest available theory need not be most accurate."
Yes, but is entirely different. Groupthink is the problem of poor decision making in organisations, largely as a result of a need to people to conform, hence poor decisions are rationalised after the event, not all alternatives are considered. and leaders exert influence on decision making. For example, why did SDSR have to include a straight choice between Tornado and Harrier, instead of reductions to both? Why was Nimrod MRA4 axed without giving any thought to an alternative MPA - leased P-3s perhaps?
Occam's razor favours the explanations supported by the least assumptions, however this should not be taken as favouring explanations that are contradicted by evidence. Too often it us used as an excuse to ignore evidence - for example basing conclusions on circumstantial evidence. Imagine a young woman called Lucy who goes to the off licence every day. You see her one evening when less than sober. Is it fair to put these two things together and assume that she has a drinking problem? What if she works at the Off Licence, and had been out with friends? Has poor Lucy now been labelled as an alcoholic despite the lack of real evidence?
Several years later, Lucy is applying for a job where you work. You mention her going to the off licence every day, ad the time you saw her drunk, but manage not to mention her job there. The HR/management types decide that she will be unreliable due to her problem and she does not get the job. Fair?
If you think this sort of thing does not happen you must be living on a different planet.
Occam's razor has value as a rule of thumb, but is no substitute for the scientific method, systems thinking, or legal due processes. Life is complex.
Back to SDSR and the axing of Harrier:
1. Back in late 2009, the plan was to prepare for CVF by embarking Harriers at sea as often as possible, for longer periods. This was what the briefings in the service at that time said, and it was also
backed by this discussion and the articles quoted at the time.
2. Following the 2010 General Election, the new Government wanted the SDSR to be completed as soon as possible, despite warning that it would need a year to complete.
3. For some reason, someone decided that there should be a straight choice between Tornado and Harrier. apart from putting both RN and RAF on the defensive, it meant that options like retaining a reduced Harrier force were not seriously studied. JFH had been cut from four to three squadrons in late 2009, so the feasibility of this option was not explored. A desire on the part of some in the RAF hierarchy to stitch up the RN perhaps? Post SDSR, there seem to be no RN pilots flying Tornado or Typhoon. Evidence of unhealthy attitudes?
4. Just before the SDSR announcement, the Prime Minister decided that we should procure the F-35C instead of F-35B, without investigating things such as the added training burden, the costs of installing extra equipment aboard
Queen Elizabeth and
Prince Of Wales, or the need for extra manpower.
5. Just before the SDSR, the Prime Minister panics as he fears cutting the Army's number when the Afghan commitment continues will lead to bad
PR. So he demands the cuts hit the RN and RAF instead. The Army gets cut anyway, several years later.....
6. Because of the commitment of Tornado to Afghanistan, coupled with the reduction in Harrier numbers in late 2009, and the RAF's desire to keep Tornado, lead the Prime Minister to go along with their plan. The alternative of smaller numbers of both jets.
7. The First Sea Lord is told this the weekend before SDSR is announced. Presenting the option of additional naval cuts in exchange for funding the entire Harrier force is not a realistic option for the RN. If there had been say a month to investigate an option to retain say a single squadron, then my personal view is that things would have been different.
8. Post SDSR, Groupthink seems to have kicked in and some have forgotten that JFH was planning not only to act as seedcorn but to return to being a ready carrier force, which would have been useful during the Libyan conflict.
9. The switch to F-35C allows the axing of Harrier to be justified on the basis that it only existed of prepare for a STOVL future, and ignoring the fact that most of the issues relating to the deck handling and whole ship aspects of carrier aviation are similar regardless of CTOL or STOVL.
10. Opposing voices are shouted down - "he's an Admiral so he would say that", "well, an ex CVS Captain is going to say that," and so on.
11. 8 to 10 can be clearly seen throughout the
Harrier thread, right from the first page.
They can also be seen on every other thread on PPRuNe/ARRSE/etc that talks about these issues.