And, of course, teaching pilots the way to control an airplane throughout the entire envelope is entirely appropriate – and had that been accomplished, this might not have happened.
Could be true but I still don't see how "Don't ever rapidly cycle any flight control on any aeroplane under any circumstances" is envelope dependent. IMHO it is far more basic than teaching the pilots how to recover from the corners of the envelope.
However, I tend to believe that at least to the same level of satisfaction you have for the training that currently exists, I believe it is uncommon to see encounters with wing-tip vortices that are handled the way this pilot did the second time.
While I'm far from being satisfied with the level of training that currently exists, I do resent the attempts to draw the syllabus even further along the wrong way. Of course it is uncommon to see wake vortices handled the way it happened on AA587, most folks use wheel/stick to roll the aeroplane. That rudder is to be used to induce roll only when wheel is not enough should be basic airmanship which lead us to...
Also, I believe you are jumping on the Advanced Maneuver Training that the airline was using.
...my opinion that the biggest problem with AAAMTP was the third "A" - advanced. I'm not suggesting that program was problematic by itself. That flying folks lacking some basic understanding are quite capable of misapplying potential life saving action and turning it into lethal one was clearly demonstrated. I really don't know whether it's better to tailor the program to dumbest common denominator and have nothing advanced in syllabus lest it be misunderstood or insist on higher selection and training criteria so every pilot can get to grips with advanced concepts.
In ideal world choice would be easy.
That is still in use in the UK? It is expressively forbidden in Germany for the last 20 years or so.
Could be no one was killed in UK through getting way too much yaw at too low speed on a winch... yet.
As we learnt it from AA587 wrong practices were accepted from the community of pilots.
Wrong theories, not practices. Until AA587 no one tried to put "whatever I do with controls below Va won't kill me" to test so misunderstandings about Va were widespread but didn't increase the death toll until that fateful day.
We know that in critical situation our brain is regressing to what we learn first.
Well then pilots mustn't have brains because in critical situations they mostly apply what they have learnt last.
What you have well learnt in initial formation is for ever.
So if it's wrong, one is doomed? Fortunately it doesn't work like that in real life. It can be forgotten, rejected , expanded upon or whatever. It is likely to influence one but is far from being set in stone.
It is important to give effect to accident reports like AA587 in pedagogy.
Too complicated for beginners and totally unnecessary to go through whole of it. "Don't cycle your anything and don't pick the wing with the rudder if there's enough aileron" would suffice.
I am of the generation that had it drilled into them BY THE FAA in its approved methods that structural failure wouldn't occur below certain speeds with full control throw.
Heck, I could pump up my number of posts just by repeating "People with scant understanding of dynamic stability should not be overly assertive around here" ad nauseam.
OF COURSE, who would buy an airplane that has a placcard or POH statement like: IF YOU SCREW WITH THE RUDDER THE PLANE WILL< REPEAT WILL< FALL APARt and KILL EVERYONE.
Today everyone in the airliner market is compelled by law to buy such contraptions. Not with the exact wording but close enough.
can't anyone conceive that the wake was bad enough to start a whole cycle of events that ended up showing the weakness of this plane?
Just those who haven't a) read the report b) understood the report c)both.
I am reminded that there was a dissenting opinion from an NTSB member about the probable cause
And I'll copy-paste the relevant part it for you once again:
Originally Posted by NTSB
To elevate the characteristics of the A300-600 rudder system in the hierarchy of contributing factors ignores the fact that this system had not been an issue in some 16 million hours of testing and operator experience—until the AAMP trained pilot flew it.
The lesson is that Airbus made a crappy tail that couldn't be inspected for fatigue, and it did fall apart under conditions that many of us have exceeded in other aircraft, by orders of magnitude, every day in turbulance, upset recoveries, and normal training regimens.
Just plain lie.
I see the problem...you don't understand that thousands of properly certificated FAA approved pilots did NOT KNOW THAT STOMPING ON THE RUDDER would cause the plane to fall apart.
That indeed was a problem... fixed now.
I'm pretty sure all Boeing AFMs have that same statement.
Airbus, ATR and Bombardier too.
BTW how come that chinese 747 that stalled and only recovered feet from the briney off NW america all those years ago not serve as an example to all plane makers in getting it right on the drawing board and making them Boeing tough?
If it stalled nearer the TOC than TOD, outcome would be pretty different.