Almost certainly coincidental. The initiating factor there was an incorrectly fitted spacer bracket by Air Transat's maintenance - the replacement engine did not seem to have the bracket as part of the kit and, likely under some pressure to get the aircraft out and earning again, they assumed they could use the old one without checking the part number.
As it turned out the design had been revised and the brackets were not interchangeable. This meant that there was insufficient clearance between the hydraulic lines and the fuel lines and the former abraded the latter until it gave way.
You may well be right that the two incidents have nothing in common.
Having said that, the GPIAA Air Transat investigation found 12 probable causes and contributing factors, of which 7 were maintenance-related.
Two of the 12 Safety Recommendations made to NCAAs and EASA also related to configuration issues:
"Review applicable airworthiness regulations and standards as well as aircraft, engines and component maintenance manuals, to ensure that adequate defences exist in the pre-installation, maintenance planning process to detect major configuration differences and to establish the required support resources for technicians responsible for the work."
and
"Review the adequacy of the current standards for identifying the configuration and modification status of major components to ensure that differences between major components of similar part numbers can be easily identified."
It would be good to think that confusion over (non)-interchangeability, and time pressures on maintenance, have both been relegated to the past - but I doubt it, even if they turn out not to be implicated in this instance.