CRAB & PAX BRITTANIC - I think your points are striking at the heart of the matter. We have 3 x recent CFIW where the PM has not intervened and 1 x where the PM intervened (but the CVR actually indicated that in this case the PM only intervened after the PF asked for help) - all 4 end up in the water.
In the NS 4 years ago just after the ETAP crash, all Operators changed there procedures to include the concept of Night stabilised approachs. (to be fair Bristows at this time were already half way there)
The Stabilised Approach should detail the vertical and horizontal profile for all night approaches conducted in VMC and a policy for the use of Automation.
(Please note I personally do not believe "Night VMC" exists until the flight path of the helicopter can be assured by visual references alone. In offshore night approaches we only really achieve this by a combination of the correct sight picture of the helidecks lights supported by some surface texture from the installation environment - there remain many who believe they are VMC at night over water just because there are not in clouds).
Moreover, the night stabilised approach included intervention parameters for the PM (unacceptable deviations) and an intervention policies that detail exactly when the PM should take control.
The intervention policy is intended to "Flatten" any cockpit gradient in place thus empowering the PM, especially if PM is not the Commander, to take over control long before the helicopter.gets anywhere near a unsafe condition.
The same policies should already be in place, detailed in the OM, for all IFR approaches, both onshore and offshore.
I have to say that 4 years ago, in the Company I worked for at the time, I met considerable resistance from fellow TRI/TREs over these policies.
In fact a number refused to buy into the concept that descent beyond the HDP (the point at which the PF announces he believes has has the required visual references I detailed above, in sight), should not occur without the express agreement of the PM In my opinion, this crucial agreement not only regularly and formally acknowledges the latent power of the PM but also is the core concept of the MCC element of the stabilised approach.
This cultural resistance to change was palpable.
As a result I do not believe that any formal training or practice is carried out in the simulator or aircraft to fully familiarise the crews in the intervention parameters and policies. I also believe it is actually very difficult to setup scenarios which would stimulate and develop these skills during training. Finally in the training environment, most Pilots perform well enough that opportinuties for the PM to intervene are few and far between.
I hate to have to come back to CRABs question on whether we should have an "Intelligent Autopilot" to do the role of the PF for us!! This is exactly what the EC225, EC155 and soon the EC175 DAFCS does!!
However, PAX BRITTANICA, the EC225 DAFCS is useless unless the crews actually engage the coupler. You will have already realised, from the number of posters advocating less Autopilot and more Manual flying just how difficult culturally it can be to get them to use the coupler.
I fact Euroopter is so painfully aware of this resistance that serious consideration is being given to design the system so the coupler is always engaged, and therefore the protection always available, on all future helicopter designs, so as to remove this cultural obstacle amongst crews.
In the meanwhile, we will keep pressing for a change that recognises the differences in AP capability such that the CAA, and or the Helicopter Operator, mandate use of the coupler from and to, defined pints in the flight envelope.
We must not forget how this thread started. With the L2 Sumburgh accident. At face value, the AAIB interim report states that L2 was descending in 3 Axis mode (Mixed Mode). There is little doubt in my mind this is likely to be the prime causal factor in this accident. If that L2 had been fully coupled this accident could never have occurred.
We do not know at this stage WHY the approach was flown in mixed mode BUT if the PF self elected to operate in this manner it is because he operates within a culture and OM that has allowed him to do so.
Hopefully the HSSG, the Government enquiry into helicopter safety and the AAIB will identify these cultural obstacles and force the Operates to properly and adequately mandate the use of Automation in sufficient detail, for each type, such that the loss of life, caused by these completely avoidable accidents, ends forever.
In addition we must now surely all recognise the enormous safety benefits of a DAFCS with in built flight envelope protections.
DB
Last edited by DOUBLE BOGEY; 15th Sep 2013 at 10:35.