Originally Posted by
Teldorserious
The current myopia is that the gear won't break. This is self delusion at it's best.
If that's the case, then why is it that "the gear" is designed in such a way that it can "break" in any myriad number of ways and leave the aircraft in a flyable state? Or that recurrent training includes scenarios where said systems fail?
AF447 went down because a lighting strike flashed the ROMS, knocked out the tubes, no iron gyros and now in turbulence, you got pilots in the dark trying to handfly an aircraft with no attitude reference.
Like Clandestino, I have no idea where you got that from - but there's no evidence whatsoever to support that scenario, and a whole load of evidence that refutes it.
Not to mention that even if the shielding were to be defeated - lightning strikes don't "flash" ROMs, all the ADIRUs plus ISIS back-up use data from gyros mounted in the unit and the FDR confirms that at least one attitude reference was working just fine throughout.
Originally Posted by
flarepilot
The control system would be Douglas strong...cables, no computer interference and the plane itself would be strong enough to handle me flying the wings off it ONCE to a safe landing.
Would that be "Douglas strong" like the THY DC-10 where a floor collapse severed all the cables and hydraulic lines? And would this be the same Douglas that swore up-and-down to Capt. Bryce McCormick that it was impossible to lose all hydraulics on the DC-10?
Don't get me wrong, Douglas did make their airframes fairly tough, but they lagged behind badly in the redundancy and survivability stakes going into the jet age. Also, any airliner using direct cable connections can't be much bigger than a DC-6. That means no more widebodies and a rapidly contracting airline industry.
Electronic control connections are much less bulky, easier to route through the more solid sections of the airframe and present a much smaller area prone to damage by debris. An electronic system is also far easier to provide re-routing redundancy if and when such damage occurs.
Originally Posted by
A37575
Round dial ASI's took your attention as their rate of change of airspeed in either direction stood out. Drum type ASI's need interpretation of a different type to round dial ASI's.
Different yes, but not more difficult if the current safety record is taken into account. Anyway, pilots have been debating the relative merits and preferences regarding instruments - and altimeters in particular - going back to the E. K. Gann days (specifically the three-needle vs. two-needle plus drum types).
Again, don't get me wrong - Clandestino is absolutely right when he says that unscrupulous management and executives are in some cases cutting stick-and-rudder experience and training too close to the bone. But let's not throw the baby out with the bathwater here - the fact is that these advances have made civil aviation a hell of a lot safer and allowed the industry to grow to a level that was unimaginable even in the '60s. This fact is as simple as it is irrefutable.
As a techie, I'm as prone as anyone to getting the rose-tinted specs out when it comes to remembering the days of bit-flipping on 8- and 16-bit processors versus the highly regimented, abstracted and process-driven methods we use today. I seriously miss the simplicity and the feeling of direct communion with the machine. But if I take those specs off for even a few seconds I realise that I'd be nuts to even attempt what is done these days using those old methods.