I'm glad that there were no plot twists introduced since interim got out and the final tale remained to be one of excellent airmanship. This crew should be honoured just as Shornstheimer/Tomkins, Genotte/Michielsen/Rofail, and Sullenberger/Skiles are.
Originally Posted by BARKINGMAD
Can we PLEASE think again on the criteria for chucking the pax down the slides and into hospital?!?!
It's simple: if it's more dangerous inside the aeroplane than outside; evacuate. Determination is the hard part. I'd say with extreme energy landing and confirming with rescue leader there indeed was fire around wheels, I'd just concur with CAD that the decision to evacuate was reasonable and suggest reading the CVR transcript as an example of stellar CRM.
Originally Posted by Killaroo
Why didn't he shut down that one stuck at hi power?
Seems like a no brainer, duh!
While report makes it clear why they made good decision not to shut it down, I'd agree it seems like no-brainers got abundant around here.
Originally Posted by ExRR
I see the first maintenance engineer gave advice and based on that the crew made the decision to continue.
Correct advice as there was only EPR fluctuation at the time and that absolutely did not unequivocally point towards the trouble that was going to occur.
Originally Posted by ExRR
By the time ME2 was involved VHHH was clearly the only possibility.
Yes, but by the time ME2 was involved engines were still operating, there was till no sign that they would become uncontrollable.
Originally Posted by ExRR
Much trust in one engine flying.
They were not flying on one engine, except briefly when trying to coax No2 to work above idle. Granted there was not much thrust from right side but at least
Originally Posted by ExRR
In hindsight the decision to continue to destination proved to be problematic.
It was appropriate. There were no indications of how serious the situation would turn out to be until very well into descent.
Originally Posted by ExRR
In hindsight the decision to continue to destination proved to be problematic. Maybe I'm being oversensitive living just a stone's throw from Kegworth.
Good you mentioned it as this incident is the exact opposite of Kegworth; here crew kept both engines running and while uncontrollable, they did provided them with means of reaching the runway. Kegworth was case of too-much-too-soon.
Originally Posted by misd-again
A/P on at 1144'. Daytime departure.
So what?
Originally Posted by JPJP
The point of the Magenta Line syndrome isn't the fact that familiarity with automation is inherently dangerous.
Exactly. There is line of ignorant opinion around here that magenta's children are folks lacking manual flying skills and that it can be cured by flying raw data manual departures and arrivals. The children of magenta are actually folks who were unable to remain calm, focused and reasonable under unusual circumstances (often of their own making) so: turned away 90° off course and hit the mountain, tried to climb aeroplane where it just wouldn't go, got so excited about gear problems they wasted all of their fuel preparing to land, took off with both IRS toppled, reextended the gear on 737 after failure just after liftoff as it were Seneca and they planned to land ahead etc. Some of them might have been lousy stick and rudder pilots, some were proven to be excellent but they perished anyway.
Originally Posted by Huck
Widebody captain at 35? That's a fairy tale over here....
If this didn't prove him commandworthy, nothing will. It's just the matter of matching the seats to bodies. It differs from location to location and also from one temporal period to another.
Originally Posted by avturboy
What I meant to say was that there hadn't been much comment in this thread.
Given the quality of the discussion we had so far, I wouldn't count it as a bad thing.
Originally Posted by crwknut roll
Oh come on...... Who do you think they asked???
Their maintenance. You know, those folks who can follow your flight parameters in real time nowadays and your aeroplane's health is their sole concern, they don't have to deal with aviation, navigation and comunication.
Originally Posted by Landflap
Looks from gleaning other posts that the aircraft wound up with thrust problems at top of climb
It does and bears no semblance to reality.
Originally Posted by Landflap
And, Lordy Lordy, if it is not your day and a GA is necessary, how are you going to do that ?
Just like in a glider. Concentrates one's mind wonderfully.
Originally Posted by johnb
From the analysis of the report I don't see that the root cause was actually identified.
(...)
I think it is likely that control was totally lost because the torque motor - servovalve was plugged and according to the report nothing was done to evaluate condition of this component.
Are you seriously suggesting a) there could be two one-in-a-couple-million FH events occurring simultaneously with contamination or b) actual mechanism of SAP affecting the FMVs is somehow of concern because we need to make them SAP resistant?
Originally Posted by FANS
After the recent BA divert to BHX, and then this incident I think we need to pay more attention to engine indications and even if there are consistent but slight EPR fluctuations, we need to question more despite engineering's assurance that it's OK to continue.
How do you propose to do that if no new probes and indicators are installed?
Originally Posted by slowjet
Appears to me that they flew the book.
They absolutely did not. There was no book and they broke quite a few procedures and limitations so everyone onboard could be blessed with continued existence.