Quite reasonably this is the time for pondering whilst we wait (no doubt for some time) for the AAIB report to divulge pretty much all.
But to me there still seems to be not enough discussion here on why, as Al-bert says, the aircraft just wasn't being flown here, given the assumed basic scenario. IR rated single pilots are expected to be able to perform these basic scanning functions on an IFR approach without any problem, and indeed this happens frequently and normally in the corporate world. Yet here we had a 3 axis autopilot, plus an IR rated co-pilot, and it apprently wasn't done. On, it would seem, a pretty straightforward IFR approach over flattish terrain.
We have opinion that says more automation is required with 4 axis autopilots used. And other opinion including the "children of Magenta" video from Helimutt that advocates selective use of less automation and more hand flying.
Before people get too carried away with the need for more to be spent on more training, better training, better avionics, autopilots, check lists, SOPs etc it would be good to get a sense of perspective on this accident. Just how many IMC approaches with say a 500ft or lower cloudbase safely take place in the NS every year? Anyone care to guestimate?
This approach ended up tragically. But all those others were presumably satisfactory, despite/because of the level of training/aircraft equipment etc. Or have NS pilots been worried for some time that there have been rather too many IFR approach errors that could well have caused an accident? And if so, have they been voiced on Pprune? I don't recall any such major threads.