Originally Posted by
ExRR
I'm curious as to the lack of any consideration or discussion in the report of the decision (however right or wrong) to have continued the flight to destination with faults showing on engines and one engine ineffective relatively early in the flight.
I think it may have crossed the minds of the crew to divert based on the report. So they were making these considerations.
"During the climb, the flight crew noticed some abnormal Engine Pressure Ratio (EPR) fluctuations on No. 2 engine, with a range of approximately ± 0.015 around EPR target. No. 1 engine also had abnormal EPR fluctuations but within a narrower range."
"shortly after levelling off at FL390 (i.e. 39,000 ft AMSL at standard atmosphere conditions), Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) message “ENG 2 CTL SYS FAULT” was annunciated. ECAM information “ENG 2 SLOW RESPONSE” was shown for crew awareness."
"The maintenance engineer (ME1) at the IOC asked the flight crew to check the responses of the engines to thrust lever movements. The flight crew advised that the EPR was fluctuating around an EPR target."
"As all engine parameters were considered normal other than the EPR fluctuations, the flight crew elected to continue the flight to Hong Kong."
"At 0316 hrs, ECAM message “ENG 2 CTL SYS FAULT” reappeared when the aircraft was levelling off at FL380. This time ECAM information “AVOID RAPID THR CHANGES” was also displayed in addition to the “ENG 2 SLOW RESPONSE”."
"The flight crew called MC again via SATCOM for further discussions. Another maintenance engineer (ME2) responded to the call and confirmed that he was aware of the earlier situation as they had been monitoring the engine parameters during the flight. The flight crew, with more concern this time, reported the ECAM message and the observed increase in EPR fluctuation (± 0.1 for No. 2 engine and ± 0.03 for No. 1 engine).
The flight crew queried whether it was safe to continue the flight."
"Significant windshear was forecasted for both runways 07L and 07R."