O F yes, I think that is fair comment in some respects, but I didn't say whose fault it was that HUMS tool was not used optimally. Two things I am aware of:
Our engineers told me they would have done things differently and looked at the shaft, since its relatively easy to do that. You could say "they would say that, with 20:20 hindsight" and maybe that is true, we can't know.
There is however I suspect a cultural difference in that Bristow is a developer of HUMS, whereas Bond is a user of it.
Secondly the amount of effort that has gone into refining the HUMS thresholds over the last 25 years or so of its existence is pretty minimal, ditto for improving reliability. That is not the operator's fault, not the manufacturers fault (well maybe) it is a cultural fault of our "system" resting on the laurels of HUMS developed in the 1980s. My point is that HUMS was quite capable of detecting the fault, and in fact did, but the warning was treated as "cry wolf" because the reliability rate of the sensors is not very good, and because the possible failure modes (of the transmission) had not been fully examined.
I did have it in mind that Bond had not downloaded the HUMS data after each flight, but if I am wrong in that respect then I apologise.