If you choose to operate with minimum fuel, it means as Dan said, you have reduced your margins (thinking time) and I think you really should have a pre-briefed plan for certain eventualities, so should a decision need to be made, time and fuel are not wasted while you decide, you have already decided what you would do and you just execute the plan.
Well said, and again it is back to education. All the SOP training in the world does not educate new commanders to think. That is too often skated over in the up grade process. I was on my line check with an F/O who, as always, was also on a line check and it included a command potential assessment. They were PF on a good weather day with minimum plog fuel on departure. Single rwy destination with a very close by alternate and good weather all round. I sit back as PM and allow them to manage the flight. Approaching TOD (-30mins) I suggest going off ATC to obtain destination and the other airfields weather. We were above cloud, so could not observe the actual good forecast for the region. The reply from PF was "why bother, it was all taf-ing good." As we would be arriving at min resv +300kgs I suggested that if anything happened it would be prudent to have an escape route well prepared and ready for immediate execution. "If you want." Yawn.
The LTC's command potential assessment was not enthusiastic and the F/O didn't understand why. Yet there they were, 6months from possible upgrade. What had they been learning from all the other captains? What had they been learning from flying with LTC's/TRI/TRE's etc. Had they too all been so complacent over the years of this apprenticeship? I hope not. As I always tried to instil in them, an SF/O should be able to fly to captain's standard, but can they think like a captain should. I asked some new upgrades about their command training: had they been in class-room discussions about the 'what if',... had they reviewed known accidents due to poor judgement; learning from others mistakes? No, it had all been pretty standard simulator scenarios with simple dual failures and nothing special. Agreed, the test could be that, but the opportunity for mass discussion and some brain storming about known events might just prevent the next one and alert the newbie about what the upgrade really means. Thinking!
Perhaps someone from RYR can inform us what was the internal reaction to the MAD/VLC event. Was it just that all crews were legal and therefore there was nothing to learn from the day and let's just ignore all the furore, or was there some education value spread amongst the crews. The former would be rather disappointing.
As a survey amongst companies: there must been incidents nearly everyday, especially in the +100 a/c airlines. So many flights over diverse regions in differing conditions; different types, different maintenance philosophies etc. Events must occur. Which airlines teach their own crews from their own events, and which keep quiet. The more the airline teaches its own crews to be aware of traps and pitfalls etc. the better the safety culture I would suggest. The opposite would be true, of course, for the quiet one.
Last edited by RAT 5; 23rd Aug 2013 at 09:40.