The ‘paper’ – as assessed on half a web page of weak reporting, is unworthy of a science title.
The safety experts ‘findings’ (when/if published) might only reflect common knowledge which represents the symptoms of part of an event; they are not a cause.
It’s human nature to be surprised, the degree of which depends on the situation, expectedness (training), or personal qualities in managing emotion. This can increase workload, but that is what a pilot should be trained to manage.
Certification requirements (CS / FAR 25) require that sudden autopilot disconnects (required to avoid serious safety hazards) must not result in the aircraft being significantly out of trim. In all of the accidents quoted, the aircraft deviations subsequent to AP disconnect resulted from crew activity; an activity presumably triggered by thought or assessment of the situation. The importance of these situational aspects is not an issue of systems’ activity – why did the autos fail (its history), but what is the aircraft doing, and what do ‘I’ wish the aircraft to do (proactive awareness).
‘Autos should transfer control with the same protocol as pilots’!!!
If only pilots would transfer control with the same provisos as current certification … , then there would be fewer dusted knuckles for those who have not trimmed the aircraft beforehand.
Whereas a pilot can communicate difficulty in flying or increasing workload, most autos cannot. Seeking for ‘automation context’ is like mind reading before a system failure.
This is crystal-ball stuff, not science; and as for the origin (hfes), perhaps they should refresh themselves of what their mission states; ‘… compatibility in the design of interactive systems of people, machines, and environments…’
Not man or machine, but both within the environment; and all considered as an interactive system.
Last edited by safetypee; 22nd Aug 2013 at 02:00.
Reason: typo