Quote:
Experience from this accident investigation in conjunction with FAA experiments suggest passive fire suppression in large cargo compartments due to oxygen deprivation may not be effective.
Uh, any other freighter pilots that have a problem with this statement? How does the FAA retain a valid certification for freighter aircraft with Class E compartments while simultaneously acknowledging this little gem.
Why can't we have the same level of protection in the main deck as we do in the lower lobes? I know it takes more structure, but the prediction in the accident report is for 4.1 more hull losses between now and 2021. At the very least, make self-fueled hazmat a road or water transport only class.
Unfortunately 'active' fire suppression wouldn't have much mattered - Li-Ion batteries provide their own oxidizer when they start to burn. So any conventional aircraft fire suppression would have - at best - marginally slowed the fire's progression to surrounding materials (same thing with chemical oxygen generators as was the case in the ValueJet crash in the Everglades).
The only fire suppression agent that's been demonstrated to be truely effective for aviation cargo fires is Halon - manufacture of which has been effectively banned due to environmental concerns (there has been success with a baking soda based agent in smaller areas - specifically engine fires - but not for the area of a massive cargo hold). We're basically using stockpiled and recycled Halon for new aircraft production - how long do you think that's going to last? Oh, and it would take a LOT of Halon to produce the minimum 5% concentration necessary to extinguish a conventional fire in an area the size of a 747F main deck.
The only real viable option is your last sentence - ban self oxidizing materials from air freight. It was done years ago for model rocket motors (with no reported self-ignition incidents). Yet we continue to allow a material with a known history of self ignition a free pass.