The final report is harrowing reading, dealing with an unstoppable, overwhelming event. However the wider question is whether the event was preventable, either by not flying that type of cargo or mandating specific packing and handling conditions to mitigate or limit the extent.
The FAA has 135 fire/smoke incidents with batteries classed as the cause, on or in the vicinity of aircraft between March 1991 through July 2013 (
report).
Seems fortunate that most incidents are detected on the ground before or after a flight. Not included in the FAA battery-incident report is UPS flight 1307 (7th FEB 2006) as the NTSB couldn't determine an absolute cause of the cargo bay fire. The NTSB didn't rule out lithium-ion batteries as the fire's origin (
last para, page 50).
The cynical view is that the aviation and/or battery industries have a Ford Pinto-esque approach which is partly rooted in pragmatism and partly actuarial - that 6 incidents a year is a very small proportion of the total number of batteries flown per year and the incovenience/cost of preventing each incident, most of which are on the ground, could easily exceed the associated losses. I hope the people who might be that cynical are given the opportunity to read this final report.