Don't disagree with the report.
Airlines can increase post crash survivability and fast egress tomorrow by widening the aisle at bulkheads and galleys from the legal minimum of 20 inches.
It would seem that a lot of the other lessons that might come from the accident have already been noted, then forgotten.
History repeats...
In late 1980 JAA considered recommendations from UK AAIB into the 1985 Manchester B737 accident about the narrowing aisles caused by bulkheads and galleys, thus restricting egress.
Not to be confused with a similar width down the aisles between seats, where there is plenty of free space between seatbacks.
Following research at Cranfield, in 1996 JAA proposed an amendment to change JAR 25.813, so aircraft with 110 passengers or more the width between rigid structures with side of an aisle should be at least 30 inches.
In 2006, (21 years after the B737 accident) a "Rulemaking Group" was set up to examine width between bulkheads.
The options identified were
1/ Do nothing
2/ Voluntary Implementation
3/ Further research and/Analysis
4/ Rulemaking option
They decided that further research was not necessary and that bulkheads were not a serious issue, that the effect of rule 2 was same as rule 1 so they went with "do nothing" option
So whilst the Cranfield tests indicate a 30 inch width is safer most airlines go with the current legislation FAR 25.815 which is 20 inches.
This report details the above.
http://www.easa.europa.eu/rulemaking...%202008-18.pdf
The video shot in the '80s at Cranfield clearly shows the difference in passenger mobility between varying galley aisle widths, a shame then that what seems like such a common sense change will apparently only be implemented by a more statistically relevant body count.