Bob Viking, I do not consider that the cost cutting statement is too harsh, and yes I realise that TCAS has never been fitted to Tornado; that's the problem. Please read on.
Two years earlier, in June 2010, there was a Category A (just one step down from mid-air collision) near miss east of Roybridge, with visibility at 50 km. One of the pilots reported that he was unaware of the proximity of the other jet above them until it was first seen in the pilot’s rear view mirrors as they turned. The small cross-sectional area of a grey GR4, head on, with no crossing motion “masked it’s [the other aircraft] presence until the last moment” The Airprox report, produced jointly by the CAA and the military concluded;
“TCAS or another form of cooperative CWS (Collision Warning System) would undoubtedly have helped to improve Situation Awareness and aid an earlier visual acquisition. Work is in progress to equip the Tornado GR4 with a CWS”
The Airprox comment leads one to believe that CWS/TCAS recommendations go back to earlier incidents, and that work is in hand to address the equipment deficiency. However, 18 months later in February 2012, and after several other incidents, another near miss took place, this time in the Moray Firth area, between a Tornado GR4 and a S92 helicopter. On this occasion the Airprox report states;
“Fitment of TCAS to the Tornado fleet is still under consideration but it is not yet funded, and it is very likely it would have increased the Tornado crew’s Situation Awareness on the S92”
In fact TCAS had been “under consideration” since 1999, when in January of that year a Tornado GR1 (prior to GR4 upgrade) collided with a civilian Cessna. All four people involved in the accident were killed. The MoD accident summary stated;
“The TCSI [Tornado Combined Safety Investigation] recommended that a Collision Warning System (CWS) for all military and civilian aircraft operating below 2000 feet be pursued with all possible haste.”
But, despite the Haddon-Cave report and the formation of the new MAA very little has changed with regards to aircraft safety and airworthiness. In the Tornado’s case we have gone backwards in two years from “Work in progress” to “under consideration but not yet funded”. Even if and when funding is approved how long will it take to modify the fleet? If we take the URGENT modification of the IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) system, following the Patriot incident in 2004, it could take six years. How many more lives will be lost in that time? In fact the ideal time to install TCAS into the Tornado would have been during the IFF modification programme, as the two systems are inter-linked, or better still during the GR1 upgrade in the early 2000s. The latter being the option outlined in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review;
“The Tornado GR4 squadrons will be given more logistic support to improve their deployability, as well as a new collision warning system early in the next century”
It seems ironic that the Chairman of the newly formed MAA Safety Advisory Committee, Air Marshal (Retired) Sir Colin Terry was Chief Engineer (RAF) from 1997 to 99 and must have been aware of the need for CWS to be installed in Tornado aircraft. And, considering that CWS needs were first addressed in 1990, following the collision two Tornado GR1s and three fatalities, it has to be assumed that his predecessor Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Alcock was also in the picture on the CWS issue. (Both officers are linked with the accidents and fatalities associated with Nimrod and Chinook). On this occasion (1990) the MoD accident summary stated;
“Technologies which provide electronic collision warning systems are being investigated”
In the end it appears to boil down to costs, but what are the costs associated with several lost lives, and lost aircraft. Cut backs on aircraft numbers and pilots are one thing, but cut backs on flight safety when there is a known problem is criminal. It is interesting to note that the following statement heads the first MAA Defence Air Safety Annual Report;
“If you think safety is expensive, try a crash”
In a 2010 provisional assessment of strategic risks to Air Safety, DG MAA reported;
"Mid-air Collision - a risk during both routine flying operations and on OP HERRICK. Incremental mitigation of this chronic risk, which has a high 'societal concern' factor, has suffered protracted delays over successive PRs since the 1998 SDR. A 'Delete Tornado Collision Warning System' Option is being run in PR11 which would prejudice the Dept's ability to declare this risk ALARP".(PR11 being MoD’s Planning Round for 2011 - the annual budget review)
However, in the DG MAA Annual Report, dated 10 Aug 11, he reported;
"The reprieve of the Delete Tornado CWS PR11 Option is welcome, but there is likely to be more that could be done"
But is the "reprieve" just a paper exercise to give the impression that CWS for Tornado is still under consideration, and therefore the risk can be regarded as ALARP? From experience gained with Nimrod, as long as it can be demonstrated that progress was being made towards ALARP MOD regards everything to be OK. The bottom line is that 15 years have passed since the 1998 SDR, and nothing has been done.
The risk associated with the two Tornados involved in the Moray Firth accident in July was not ALARP. The risk associated with the whole Tornado fleet is not ALARP, and has never been ALARP since the mid-1990.