Experience from this accident investigation in conjunction with FAA experiments suggest passive fire suppression in large cargo compartments due to oxygen deprivation may not be effective.
Uh, any other freighter pilots that have a problem with this statement? How does the FAA retain a valid certification for freighter aircraft with Class E compartments while simultaneously acknowledging this little gem.
Why can't we have the same level of protection in the main deck as we do in the lower lobes? I know it takes more structure, but the prediction in the accident report is for 4.1 more hull losses between now and 2021. At the very least, make self-fueled hazmat a road or water transport only class.
I hope and pray that all this excellent report's safety recommendations are implemented without hesitation or modification, the brave crew who perished and freight pilots everywhere deserve nothing less.
Unfortunately, the regulatory agencies have a very bad record implementing safety recommendations from accident report. I can only speak for the US system on this, but the NTSB is regularly ignored by the FAA on these recommendations. It usually takes 3 or 4 major accidents before the FAA finally begins to implement the safety recommendations of the NTSB.
Take fatigue for example, it has been a factor in almost every accident and the FAA happily ignores any NTSB recommendations on how to mitigate it.
