601
I remember, but there is/was a bit of a difference between now and then in that they/we were even then, still writing the rules and most of the aircraft were then but mere children with the factory "liquid paper" stuff still intact on the engines and stuff.
Triadic, says it all, there is now
an even more urgent need for this
"proactive attitude" to be applied, given that the said "liquid paper" is a long gone memory and the "corporate memory" of the "way we were" (which actually worked) is a long gone memory for the oldies and a "never was" for the youngsters like RHS and others.
Otherwise it is just as futile as rearranging the deck chairs on the "Titanic".
Sir Donald has a lot to answer for, most of it very good to excellent.
His shadow towers over the strolling adventurers who would presume to "know", because they can indulge their hobby without the usual let or hindrance that ordinary mortals actually "know".
These "knowees" decided, unilaterally, that we needed to throw the baby and everything else that looked like the past, out with the bathwater.
Someone in these halls suggested that we need to go waaaaay back, throw everything out and start again from where we actually knew where we were, circa early 1980's or pre RHS.
It then, worked a whole lot better than it does now.
It was suggested that this had the potential to destroy safety management systems and occurrence reporting and as a result reduce the levels of safety that many have worked for by causing a 'dry up' of reporting.
If nothing else but that came out of FLOT then it was worthwhile.