pointless distinctions
gazumped,
I figure there are only 4 people who know what the picture out the front window looked like when it mattered. In truth, no one else can say with certainty what that picture was - we know that ground observers have a very limited area in which to observe, made much worse if they happen to be in the middle of the weather and, because the situation is quite often very dynamic, the preceding aircraft can also see a totally different picture.
As for things like holding fuel, well, forecasting when a fog is going to lift is probably more difficult than predicting when it is going to form - and we know how well that's been going lately!
At Mildura, once thing was very clear - the aircraft were committed to land there and it was entirely preferable to do so with the engines running. It was inevitable that they would run out of fuel at some stage, so all the rules and regulations that are designed for normal operations and to prevent such situations arising had already passed their 'use by' date on commencing the approach. What occurred was 2 different crews practicing dynamic decision-making in what I believe were different circumstances of time and space.
The outcome was fabulous - the alternatives were all very bad.
If we get a decent investigation and we get a decent report (unfortunately still mutually exclusive propositions) that allow us to maximise the training benefits, we will all be so much better for the event.
So I propose we park the carping stone-throwing and concentrate on the lessons. The best of those in this case for you may be a reminder that:
'the rules are for the guidance of wise men and the blind obedience of fools'.