What a number of us have tried to argue on this forum is that a visual approach, especially at SFO, may not be as simple as it appears.
I have flown into SFO enough to know that it can be very challenging ie landing a large jet when being given inappropriate speed/height constraints.
Obviously, a visual into SFO, is not something that a majority of crew thinks is unreasonably dangerous. If that was the case, fine.
If the NTSB does a proper investigation, it will make their determinations based on standards, not how things "appear", level of "challenge" or what a "majority" think. It's not a matter of trying to identify possible pieces of cheese to line up in the manner most supportive of making it look as if the mishap was inevitable. If a given "piece of cheese" was in the pilot's hands to begin with (i.e. - prior knowledge of a having to perform a given approach) then it is how the pilot places that cheese in the stack that is the contributing factor, not the mere existence of the cheese.
An approach is either executable within in the established standards for the aircraft and crew or it isn't. A mishap investigation does not deal in "near the limits", but within published limits. If "near the limits" is unsafe, then the limit needs to be corrected. If a given limit hasn't been established taking normal operator frailty into account, then both the operator standards and the aircraft/maneuver limits need to be revisited. As my late uncle would say, "There is no such thing as almost pregnant". The flight was either assigned an approach that was within the standards for the type aircraft and crew, or it wasn't. That determination has to be made on sound technical info, not feelings or personal opinion. Otherwise, it would be impossible to determine what is a safe maneuver.
You can't ascribe causative or contributing factors until you establish the standards the aircraft and crew are held to, and the standards they failed to meet. In my investigating experience, there were no end of maneuvers that were based upon proper standards that were only challenged when a crew member failed to perform, or failed to admit that he couldn't perform, until after the mishap.
And yes, I investigated mishaps where the commander should not have assigned a given mission profile to a given crew or crewmember. However, the crew has mouths, and are not absolved unless they spoke up. Embarking on a mission or maneuver that is beyond what you think is your ability level cannot be absolved, unless there is a real, loaded gun at your head. "Job security" is not a real, loaded gun when the lives of others are at risk. It is simply the same concern for your pocket as that which drives the "management" you condemn.
I said it before and will say it again, until pilots' unions take job actions for higher standards, to include more hands on time, the existence of these safety threats are not the sole sin of management. In effect, while the trend in "management" thinking may be cutting costs, there is a trend in pilot thinking is cutting workload and responsibility - and thus, wanting simpler or mandatory automated approaches, for example, to make up for lesser hands on capabilities.
The thing is that you can't have it both ways. Without standards, there is chaos.