Ethiopean 787 fire at Heathrow

[amicus]

NewVisitor,
.Thank you for your thoughtful and rational comments, they are much appreciated.
I have been working in aerospace engineering since being a young squirt apprenticeship in 1952 at De Havillands. We even had a composites departmen in 1952, well only the superb Mr. Johnston, who I served under for six months and learned copious initial composites knowledge and data from that kind and superb gentleman.
In the early 50's,we employed Redux phenolic bonding extensively on our aircraft including the Sea Vixen and the ill fated Comet 1 for stinger to wing skin bonding as well as for many fuselage components.
I have been working and specializing in the design and analysis of aerospace composites since the mid-60's, so I hope that I know enough to contribute something of merit, from both the engineering and historical aspects of composites in in paricular, the flammability and fire hazards of the 787.
Incidentally, I finished my engineering career consulting concerning composites for three years at Boeing Commercial, so I know pretty well Boeing engineering and BMT. plus Allen Fawcett pretty well as well as many others composites folks at Boeing or now retired.
My point in writing extensively concerning both the flammability and FST hazards of the epoxies on 787 stems from a lot of experience working on FST with NASA, Moffet, Ciba-Geigy, Celanese and several other companies in the early 70's. I I worked for many years getting all FST hazardous epoxies banned for A/C interiors for many years or even decades and the FAA finally passed the no epoxy for interiors in the middle 80's.
Now we are faced with epoxies with FST hazards all over the 787 and the flammability and FST problems inherent therein
I have had many discussions since 2005 with FAA , Boeing, Airbus et al concerning the FST hazard inherent in that A/C,and , I note, trying to work properly through the FAA system. Clearly and undeniably there exists both a flammability and major FST hazard on that A/C calling into question survivable crash flammability and crash hazards.
In summary, I got nowhere, as the FAA always ignored my comments or paid stand bureaucratic lip service with no resulting safety corrections, crash testing or the like, so now we are unfortunately placed as engineers and , I hope,well qualified composites experts, fearing a fatal incident on 787, which could have been and should have been avoided.
Concerning the Ethiopian fire, I again note that the FAA agreed, under strong Boeing pressure, to only have internal burn-through fire insulation on the lower half of the 787.
I protested long and loudly to the FAA concerning the lack of any such insulation on the upper 180 degrees of the fuselage and the LHR fire was in the right place to prove my point, their errors and fortunately with no loss of life, THIS TIME.
I lived through and worked upon the Comet disasters and don't want that experience repeated, but it will be if strong steps and measures are finally and rapidly taken by Boeing, the FAA, EASA and NTSB to correct and remedy the inherent design deficiencies of the 787.
I am neither a Cassandra nor an eccentric, merely a aerospace engineer specializing in design and analysis of composites engineering since the early 60's plus Mr. Johnston's earlier wisdom and training in composites and biffing me around the ears in the early 50's at De Havillands.
And you, Sir, are a breath of sanity and fresh air on this forum as there has been much codswallop written here regarding fires, repairs, and crash-worthiness et al on this board and my Boeing engineering and BMT friends grew to be well attuned to that remark and assessment and remarks concerning codswallop in my three years consulting with them.