It is quite obvious to all professionals that this approach look pretty much like what is called an unstable approach, but was that the only cause?
An accident or even an incident is always the result of multiple things going wrong, sometimes even things that are not so obvious at the first glance.
We know the glideslope was off, that might have been a contributing factor, but it can be replaced by other things like fix distance / altitude checks, the simple rule 1NM - 300ft that all pro's should know applies.
The flight was vectored to a 17NM final and cleared for a visual approach after more than 10 hours flight time, a visual approach can be a demanding manouver, maybe another contributing factor?
Initially the aircraft was high and fast on the approach, descent rates from 1.600ft to 500ft was around 1.400 ft/min average, about double of what is normally required. Another contributing factor? Maybe.
The A/T was mentioned, it did not perform as expected in maintaining airspeed. A contributing factor? Maybe.
Anyhow, a pilot must be able to take over an aircraft from any state of automation to manual flying (that means manual flight with manual thrust without flight director) at any time when the automation does not perform as he wants it to do. Some discussions about which mode on the Boeing does this and that mode on the Airbus does that is just nutpicking and bores me to death, it really does not matter: If it does not do what I want it to do or expect it to do, I switch it off and do it manually myself. So what? So simple! The very basic competence of a good pilot. It is the pilot who controls where the aircraft goes to, not the aircraft that controls where the pilot goes to.
As the flight was a training flight, several questions arise to me:
- How much training did the Captain under Supervision receive during the transition to the new type?
- Airlines in Korea are known to hire contract pilots on all aircraft types, so who did pay for the new type rating? The trainee or the airline?
- How much, and what kind of training did the Training Captain receive during his training to Instructor Pilot?
- Was the training the pilots received sufficient? The training certainly met the minimum standards required by authorities, but is that enough?
Modern Jet Airplanes are very complex systems, I would even say they belong to the most complex systems, mankind is able to build. The are heavy, they are fast, they have a lot of interacting systems and computers build in.
The Operating Manuals are really thick books with hundreds of pages, some even way over thousand pages. Pilots are expected to know every single sentence and note of their Operating Manual, additionally to the aircraft manual, a pilot must know a whole bunch of other books and rules to perform his job well. But there is a difference between just memorizing a book and putting the knowledge to good use in an instance of a second while handling an aluminium tube of two hundred tons of weight through 3 dimensions of space and put it down on a 60m wide and 3400m long piece of concrete in one piece (or even less...).
There are minimum requirements defined by the authorities for a new type rating course, but are these minimums enough to feel comfortable as a pilot in command on an airliner? Take a four weeks ground course, click a few thousand pages of CBT (Computer Based Training) slides, have 10 sessions of each 4 hours simulator, maybe even at night time when every other brave soul lies at bed and sleeps, have a check ride and here you go, you are legal to operate the big aircraft as Commander or First Officer. Do you feel safe and comfortable now to operate your new aircraft in any condition, in any weather, in any technical condition, at any time?
Could minimum training might be a contributing factor as well? Maybe.
How about the company culture? Is a go around a mandatory report in the company or has the company so much trust on its skipper (who they trust a 250M$+ aluminium tube) to decide whether he likes to go around or not for a few hundred or thousand bucks? A Go Around is just 10 or 15 minutes more flight time, sometimes even less than circumnavigating a bad weather area or fly a little bit holding because the runway needs to be cleared of snow and ice. A Go Around seems to cost money, yes, it burns fuel and uses flight time, but if not done, it is much more expensive if the aircraft crashes and not only the fuel burns. A pilot makes this decision to produce safety, not to save money. If he would be there to save money, he would be called a banker, not a pilot. But converting safety to a monetary value is really difficult.
Another point of company culture is the hierarchy gradient between flightcrew members. Does the Captain loose face if the First Officer gives a speed call? Does the First Officer (or Second Officer) have the authority to call for a go around? Possibly even as an observer from the jump seat? What if you call for a Go Around just because you think "It does not feel right..."?
What will happen? Nothing? A report written followed by coffee without cookies with management?