That crash would never have happened with an automated cockpit, and the move towards getting pilots out of airliners just took a huge leap. The day is coming, and like the horseless carriage opponents of yesteryear it would behoove us to accept and adapt to that fact.
I agree, I cannot understand why so many people on this thread seem to believe the problem is too much automation - to me it seems like not enough, particularly for the minimum-training regime that many people are saying is common for Asian airlines. Had the ILS been available, and an ILS-coupled autopilot been used, would the accident have occurred? No? What precision GPS approaches were available that could have been used, and why weren't they? That's just as much a question as the apparent lack of hand-flying ability.
So to me it would be perfectly reasonable for Asiana's bean-counters and risk assessors, to decide an appropriate response to this crash is NOT to increase training for hand-flying, but rather require ILS or other precision approaches for all operations. Isn't this something that could reasonably be attained in the next few years if made a priority by operators and airports? For wide-body operations at least.
Related to that, was the ILS available for 28R and could Asiana have landed there? Could an airline state to ATC that they require a precision approach, even in CAVOK conditions, if they had a policy against visual approaches? I realize there are complications as it relates to separation with parallel runways.