Original quote posted by Lonewolf_50
Hmmm, I don't think that's what the "do nothing" proponents are suggesting.
Looking back in the archives, the "do nothing" came from a PJ2 posting:
Original posting by PJ2: I wrote on July 30th, 2009 that the correct response was to "do nothing". I don't claim any special prescience...it's just the logical thing to do when in cruise. When this entire matter was conflated in subsequent discussion, I argued that the memorized items were not only confusing but the entire drill and checklist were poorly written. The "above FL100" memorized item to pitch to 5deg and set CLB thrust was, in my view, intended to cater to high density altitude airfields, not cruise altitudes. But this is not clear in the drill.
There has been plenty of discussion on this item throughout these threads, and I suggest the use of mm43's excellent PPRuNe search tool, to find these discussions.
The BEA press conference comment is, in my view, incorrect. While control would not be lost with an increase of pitch of 2.5deg to an attitude of 5deg, (because the pitch is already 2.5deg in cruise, roughly), the maneouvre does de-stabilize the aircraft when the aircraft is already stabilized in level flight with a good pitch attitude and power setting which were just fine moments before the UAS event. In fact, if one is not trained or accustomed to high altitude handling of a transport aircraft, one may be hunting a great deal with either a CC or an SS to maintain a pitch of 5deg. I just can't see, and never could see this memorized item making any sense whatsoever when in cruise flight.
PJ2 post continued:
At cruise altitudes, I have argued that this was no emergency at all, it was an abnormal which required standard responses as trained, and which required no action other than to get out the QRH checklist for the pitch and power settings. Most here disagreed with this view, citing the "Above FL100 decision-point, but frankly there is no way that setting 5deg pitch is indicated in cruise.
Whether this PF intended to set 5deg or 15deg or something else cannot be factually determined at this time. But the airplane pitched up, and it was held there until the stall while both pilots accepted the trajectory, the pitch attitude and the loss of energy. We can only surmise why, and that, is, I think hindsight territory
Now, perhaps some correction of both roll and nose down tendency needed to be accomplished to return the airplane to the original flight path, but in a different manner than what would be used at low speed and altitude. BTW, the loss of altitude (300 ft. or so) accompanied by roll and nose down was reported in some other UAS incidents.
There were considerable discussions regarding the state of mind of the PF & PNF:
Original posting by PJ2
Quote:
Ah, but was it surprise or "startle" which affected the PF, or was it abject fear?
Either can be argued but in doing so think about what is being said. What business has "abject fear" got in possessing a crew under the quite normal-for-the ITCZ circumstances faced that night and a system failure which, while disconcerting and even initially confusing, was neither an emergency nor as I say a massive failure of engine or aircraft structure? Why abject fear? Startle yes, but then an automatic response? My question is, what must be assumed for such an answer to be rational and in keeping with all those goals we hold dear?
A rapid decompression would certainly startle someone!, and the drill is there to do. Here, there was nothing to indicate a requirement for immediate action.
I want to be careful here not to portray this up as "judge-and-jury" discussion - it is not. It is an attempt by one experienced captain among many here, to keep the original question open rather than "answering" it with, "it was 'startle' factor, and therefore we need to train that out of pilots".
My point is, surprise notwithstanding, (been there a few times...with adrenaline), the intent of thorough training and flying transport aircraft with experienced crews is discipline when things go wrong, reversion to known responses and effective crew communication and why that didn't occur here. The BEA Report goes as far as it might in my view in answering this question but it isn't a complete answer. I think that is for the industry at large to answer, as per the larger discussion concerning automation and "wither airmanship?" I'm not dismissing the startle response - that would be silly. I am asking for some careful thought before assigning it.
In summary, the best response to an event such as UAS by a flight crew is this:
Original posting by PJ2
The "better way" is in how the response was made right from the start of the event. The SOPs do not change significantly from type to type. The trained crew response to an emergency or an abnormality is, with minor variations throughout the industry, very clear and very specific:
- Take control of the aircraft, (usually the PF) and ensure stable flight and navigation;
- Communicate: PF announces the emergency/abnormality so the other crew member, (PM), is aware and shifts thinking and priorites to the emergency/abnormality, (where applicable, PF takes radio communications responsibilities);
- PF calls for the "ECAM Actions" first, then the QRH checklist where applicable;
- PM executes/completes ECAM actions, clearing messages as they are completed;
- When finished, PM calls "ECAM Actions Complete" and calls up the Status Page for aircraft and system condition review;
- When aircraft/system Status is reviewed, PF calls for any applicable QRH checklists. For example, sometimes landing data requires modification;
- Secure the aircraft for continued flight or diversion;
- Communicate with ATC, F/A's (through their leader) and company dispatch;
- Passenger announcement, if required;
- Monitor changes in aircraft performance, fuel situation etc, as required.
Sadly, none of the "better way" happened as related to AF 447.
Hope the above is helpful and appropriate in the current ongoing discussions...
TD