At this point I would like to reiterate that, in the eyes of the US treasury, it's all about gross savings, not marginal savings.
agreed, now how does your theory save exactly though?
Obviously no-one involved wants any aircraft cancelled, but I can guarantee that aircraft numbers are going to fall significantly and any cut in numbers is going to increase the cost...but refining the programme to just one design would probably mitigate some of those extra costs. You speak as if you still believe 2400 is an achievable number for the US services, which to me seems quite blatantly not the case any more. I would go as far as to say I would be surprised if they achieve half that number.
Why does the Air Force get priority over the marines in the air warfare game? I think the answer is pretty self explanatory, especially as the navy don't want the F35.
probably how?
I'm failing to see how the USAF urging for the cancellation of the B and C, which eliminates over 600 aircraft in the US alone, not even including variants international partners will need, and have already invested time an treasure in (like the UK). And that causes fewer F-35s of all types to be purchased overall, thus driving up the cost for other countries that will buy the F-35A like the dutch, norwegiens, Japanese, Australians, and Canadians, who are already having a hard time justifying the cost as it is.
It seems kind of knee jerk to me. and it doesn't make the aircraft cheaper for the air force. It deprives them of interservice, and international support. and the program would essentially collapse as the USAF decides it will destroy the program because only it is worthy of receiving them? your hypothesis is "the jsf will cost so much the only option to get more of them is to make them cost more, and then buy more of them"
Even if the navy doesn't like the F-35C they have publicly acknowledged that their participation helps the program and they will essentially take one for the team, like it or lump it. everyone knows that if they play the jsf game, they get more airplanes rather than going it alone and getting less. speaking of budgets and beggars not being choosers, the DoD doesn't really care about the navy's opinion. they are getting them, providing they can catch a wire
I'm all for saving money and getting a lot of airplanes, what you suggest does neither. so it doesn't help with the trillion dollar debt. if it saved money it might be worth considering, but you have not shown me how killing the b and c would decrease overall cost after increasing cost on the A variant. how does that lead to a net savings? or alternately, how does it lead to more F-35s purchased? you said:
The coming choice seems to be between all 3 variants being produced in far fewer numbers, or the A variant being the sole survivor in moderate numbers.
I would like to see how you conclude that the sole survivor scenario does in fact mean more JSFs overall, than say a 20 percent reduction for the USN (current plan 260) and USMC (current plan 420, total = 680 aircraft F-35B and C) which would be 544 aircraft at 80 percent of planned right now. how does the Air Force meet or exceed that number? can you explain to me how many more the USAF would get with "moderate" numbers? How does the USAF kill the F-35 B and C and get more JSFs than the two services combined would have gotten anyway albeit in fewer numbers? Why does the air force decide to pay more for aircraft it was going to purchase anyway? the JSF line is going to run for decades, why would the USAF push for the cancelation of the B and C now and spend the next 20-30 years trying to carry the load all by itself at a higher cost with no international help?
You might have a case if the USN or USMC could be persuaded into buying the F-35A, because it does simplify things, and doesn't take away 600 aircraft that drive up the cost for the few poor bastards who actually stay in the program (which would be no one, since there are alternatives). It would be your F-22, B-2 scenario all over again. which is why they wont do it. I would think the countries that have been involved in the program would have a problem with it as well. you end up with an F-22 the sequel. an overly expensive jet that only the USAF has.
If the option is 400 JSFs for the Air force or 2,000+ for all the US air arms, and all the partner countries then obviously option 2 will happen. its far more likely that all variants are built in fewer numbers, than one variant built in the fewest numbers. even a 33 percent reduction in all projected US JSFs is still over 1600 aircraft. even at that reduced number the B and C account for nearly 450 of that number. but you said "half that number" didn't you? so lets go with that. 340 B's and C's. vs about 850 F-35As for the USAF. so how can the USAF get to nearly 1200 aircraft or more in your scenario, when you are convinced they will only get 850 at the ideal projected price?
if canceling the B/C (850 F-35As) increases that F-35A cost even further, say 20 percent, we are looking at a total of 960 F-35As for the USAF. so how is that more? how is that saving?
If you have some kind of evidence that deliberately death spiraling the program to the point of cancelation would help, I would like to see it and would consider it. I am open to be convinced on this one. or how the cancellation of the B and C make the A cheaper, when the whole theory is saving through mass production.
so to sum it up:
How does canceling the B and C prevent increased costs on the A?
How/why do international partners stay in the program if the cost does increase?
how/why do partners that wanted the B and C stay in the program?
how does the price increase lead to the USAF being able to afford more than if the price was lower, and the burden more evenly spread?
how does higher cost mean more aircraft purchased, when you acknowledge there is less funding?
how does canceling the B and C lead to a net savings? and/or more aircraft?
how does the program not collapse, with the withdrawal of everyone except the USAF?