gums & USMCprobe: while the FPV points you both raise were of interest, the FPV equivalent (FD) wasn't working in that A330 when airspeed went unreliable. (That is how I understand the system. If I misunderstand, apologies for adding to the noise)..
Per HN39,
I've no experience with FD's but note that they were mostly unavailable in the first 40 seconds of the zoom-climb, and locked on to 6000 fpm V/S then 1400 fpm only after the pilot commanded those RoC's apparently independently of the FD's.
Comment for HN39:
I just can't see any reason for him to zoom-climb to seek the limit of envelope protection.
Even the pilot in the left seat seemed concerned by the right seat pilot' climb. (Per CVR in report)
AZR:
OK, thanks for clarifying that for me. I agree that a law reversion is "something more" to take into account for the crew, but I believe that the advantages of normal+alternate+direct laws are more important than the disadvantages (including the quite possible but not proven 'mode confusion').
So long as the pilots both know how the system works, and have practiced it (see BOAC's "properly trained" point) the law degradation slope makes sense (to me) when one looks at the system as a whole. The training point, the training objecive, would hopefully include knowing your systems and sub systems well, and be able to apply the following trouble shooting approach:
"If this is what's wrong, and these lights/alerts are going off, this is what the plane is doing or about to do, or not doing ... "
Being unable to determine "what's it doing" based on "this is what's wrong" opens a crew up for errors in remedy for a malfunction. (True for a lot of different aircraft and situations)
NTA:
If they had an attitude indicator. why are we here?
If the A/H was operational, then, why did they not look at it?
Ever since the release of the FDR info during the interim report era, that question has been foremost. The answer lies in the realm of
post hoc mind reading, or best guess speculation.
We aren't ever going to know, but we can infer a breakdown of the instrument scan of both the pilot at the controls, and his co pilot.
One of the better guesses is that PF was following the FD, at least for a while, which he didn't realize was going wrong ... which it will do when airspeed goes all wrong, as at the initiation of the event.
henra:
A/H that is called PFD.
There is also not the slightest indication it didn't work correctly. Please don't let us go back to that tinfoil hat discussion.
It just seems what they saw didn't ring a bell?
Might this lead one to label the event as being the result of "confusion" rather than "mode confusion" ... I'd better duck ...
Barking:
Can anyone explain why Monsieur Le Capitain did not notice an unusual deck angle during his sprint to the flight deck? Any of us who've walked in the aircraft during initial climb, especially on empty positioning sectors as pax, have been aware of the deck angle and the extra effort to walk uphill.
The "uphill walk" might have informed his initial verbal offering of "What are you doing" as he arrived on scene in the cockpit.
jejeant:
I have always suspected that the captain was not in the rest accommodation
So, where was he -- in the lavatory?
HN39:
The flight director displays could have prompted him to command a positive pitch angle, of about 15°.
This value is the first option in the UAS procedure for the take-off phase below thrust reduction altitude.
It is possible that, even though he did not call it out, the PF had recalled this memorised value and then had clung to this reference without remembering that it was intended for a different flight phase.
The conjunction of this remembered value and the flight director displays may have constituted one of the few (and maybe even the only) points of
consistency in his general incomprehension of the situation.
Back to an early discussion on training, recency of training, and BOAC's point on "properly trained" pilots. Seems a decent estimation.