A4, yes ‘a Professional pilot should have the ability to admit they've screwed up’, but more often we don’t do that, even to our self. ‘Hopefully we learn from it’ and strive to avoid similar circumstances.
With the greatest respect to visually impaired accountants who manage their jobs successfully and accurately, I prefer pilots without a blindfold of ‘it won’t happen to me’.
Human performance is variable; this incident can be judged as an (unacceptable) extreme, and although the outcome was safe there was still risk, but at some point that was managed – why, how. The issue is not about the acceptability of risk, but one of human performance where variability is ill determined as too might the level of acceptability – that's in the eyes of the beholder, who draws the line. We all need to draw our own lines, but how can we be sure it is always in the right position.
I agree that the industry should put aside the search for ‘the problem’; “…accept and accommodate ambiguity over what the problems are, ‘defining the problem’ need not , and, often, should not, be the starting point …”
We should heed the principles of human factors, of systems thinking, and of how safety might be improved - the fundamentals.
We should accept that this type of event can be seen from a different viewpoints, not exclusively of being ‘reckless’ or ‘they should have done better’, but with views attempting to understand how this, the next crew, or ourselves might avoid such circumstances.
How can the industry avoid or overcome those issues identified by cps (#102), and identify which items come together ‘by chance’, or be of significance in particular circumstances.
There are many pilots operating today who can and do accomplish that, but are they able to explain how or why, or provide assurance their performance will always be adequate.