My version (with apologies to the authors of BEA's Final Report, paragraph 2.1.3.3.1):
The flight director displays, the doubt regarding the relevancy of the aural stall warning and the identification of the possibility of an overspeed situation did not allow the PF to make a correct diagnosis. He therefore implemented a combination of antagonistic actions to respond to both an overspeed situation (reduction in thrust, nose-up inputs) and to a stall situation (application of maximum thrust).
Thus, it seems likely that the flight director exerted an influence.
The flight director displays could have prompted him to command a positive pitch angle, of about 15°. This value is the first option in the UAS procedure for the take-off phase below thrust reduction altitude. It is possible that, even though he did not call it out, the PF had recalled this memorised value and then had clung to this reference without remembering that it was intended for a different flight phase. The conjunction of this remembered value and the flight director displays may have constituted one of the few (and maybe even the only) points of consistency in his general incomprehension of the situation.