Connets -
is it possible that there was an initial reluctance to go around because this would have entailed exposing one's self to managerial scrutiny and critical comment? To what extent has the policy referred to above been developed and applied anywhere? What is the current general practice, or does this vary from one airline to another? Is there any prevailing operational culture which either contributes to, or detracts from, safety?
In BA, the only requirement for a 'report' was for a g/a below 1000'. It needs to be borne in mind that the two engined 'surprise' g/a is often the one that is mishandled, whereas the one in the simulator with an engine out is 'normally' properly handled. By 'focussing' via a report on the sub 1000' g/a it allows any possible lessons to be learned and disseminated. In my experience, there was never any 'tea and biscuits' following such. In any case, the BA Flight Data monitoring would 'capture' all g/as whatever the height and would have flagged up nay 'anomalies'.
On a slightly different angle, would ATC have made any contribution to this incident, and would this have increased any reluctance on the part of the pilots to go around because a report might have exposed ATC staff?
In my opinion yes and no
. I think the runway change did not help, but in any case the a/c was probably more than the 6000' or so 'off the groove' for the original runway, so it would have been a 'screamer' anyway. I doubt any thoughts of ATC came into the equation.
is that the correct euphemism?
In my experience it has been 'coffee, no biscuits'
