4 years after the event and (as an engineer) I am still annoyed by this.
1. AoA meter: yes would have been useful but any pilot capable of discerning its usefulness would be unlikely to be in this situation in the first place. Crucial to recovery and avoidance of secondary stall, but you need to get to the correct mental picture first. In a situation where the world seems to have gone mad, its output would have been condemned with all other indications.
2. Unusual Attitude Mode: well that turns out to be f' all use. How unusual do you have to get. How about an unusual dynamics mode (ie descending at 10000ft/min, nose in the air, engines at full thrust when 2 mins ago was crusing at 35).
3. Inhibition of stall warning. Well Ok, see where the designers where going...
4. Affirm mode by changing some colours on the FD ? In a crisis I am supposed to notice and swing my mind around to that ?
5. Let the THS go way beyond normal limits and not scream about it ?
6. Have a SOP which says blank FD when the software could automatically do it ?
Trouble is that in design you design around nominal conditions and then think about isolated excursions/perturbations. Need to crowbar the logic in some situations.
How about a 'Ghastly Silence' mode (combine it with Unusual Attitude) in which all noises and flashing messages are inhibited except for the crucial ones (OK a button push and you can have all you secondary and tertiary warnings and warblings back), such as what protections have been inhibited, pitch, descent rate, air speed, trim and any other thing you guys think are the first things that should be addressed.................