Whist Qantas had taken a similar deliberate policy of reduced flap/idle thrust to save money (which they did -$ several million) I think perhaps the greater contributing factors to QF01 were:
1. FO decided to do a bit of practice manual flying and manual thrust (perhaps towards an active TS is not the best time?) and got high and fast on the approach. Over the fence at 80' ish at Ref+15ish (168knots).
Touch down was circa 1000m from landing threshold leaving just over 2200m remaining. - for a heavy B744.......
2. The runway was soaked from a very recent monsoon downpour (preceding A/C - another QF - went around but crew weren't informed).
3. Lightning visible (and commented on by crew) at field.
4. The were directed to the shorter, ungrooved runway.
5. The aircraft floated - a lot. The Captain ordered a go-around just as the mains touched. WITHOUT SAYING ANYTHING he then retarded the thrust levers but one was not properly retarded which resulted in auto brake deactivation. REVERSE WAS NOT SELECTED. Manual braking didn't commence till about 15 seconds (?) after touchdown.
6. Aircraft left the hard stuff at about 80 knots.
This had nothing to do with reduced flap landing and everything to do with poor SA, poor decision making and very poor cooperation. The reduced config policy had worked fine up until this point. We are paid to make the most appropriate decisions with regard to safety and efficiency. As soon as compromising variables get thrown into the mix......out goes efficiency in my book. FOG/TS/busy TMA - fuel accordingly. ++RA with resulting WET runway - FULL reverse (caution aquaplane/swing) but am I bothered about noise?
The above details are from memory - so I apologise if they are not exactly correct, but they're not too far from the truth.
I strongly recommend digging out the report - sobering reading.
So F3 has its place and benefits - but just use common sense (airmanship?) when making your decisions.