Originally Posted by ATC Watcher
Accidents such as AF447 or TK1951 to take 2 recent ones, but also the incidents we see in ATC today,( especially those involving STCA and TCAS) strongly point out to a discrepancy between humans operators and automated systems, also programmed by humans, and how both interact with one another.
Yes, but that doesn't mean that machine part can compensate fully for human shortcomings. Especially as these machines go unscathed through millions of flight hours and thousand of abnormals/emergencies in hands of other crews.
However, this doesn't imply that those crying "Bad pilots!" are right.
Originally Posted by Lonewolf 50
Why is "they climbed too high caused the stall" rather than "the AoA was held and maintained too high as airspeed/energy bled off so they stalled?"
I am afraid you are reading too much into shorthand I used because I assumed I had public consisting of professional pilots.... mainly. I have written that it was to be expected to get stall warning when one climbs above performance limited level, believing folks who discuss the accident needed not be reminded that excessive pitch used by CM2 lead to terrifying RoC, which shouldn't be encountered in normal maneuvering in lower stratosphere. Besides, reason for climb was never verbalized.
You are correct in saying that such a severe pitch demand would cause them to run out of energy below MAX REC if they started a few levels lower but it is also true that they would have hit stall warning if they used smaller pitch but insisted on climbing, it would have merely postponed reaching of stall warning AoA.
Further reading: Pinnacle 3701, West Carribean 708, Pulkovo 612.
Originally Posted by Lonewolf 50
What am I missing here?
They did not begin at FL300. CM2 and captain discussed possibility of climb and decided against it as it was too warm. When proverbial hit the fan, CM2 tried to climb anyway.
Originally Posted by Oakape
OK, next question. Is there any indication that the flight crew on AF447 aware that they were in alternate law?
They've seen in it on ECAM. CM1 read it out aloud. There is no indication they understood the implications of it.
Originally Posted by BOAC
I suspect yes, they knew they were in Alternate Law but did not know what it meant and I'm sure had the 'AB will look after you if you just pull back' message running through their heads.
This message is delivered only for windshear and GPWS escapes in normal law i.e. when terrain contact is a factor. Cruising over atlantic, there is absolutely no point in trying to get maximum climb performance.
Originally Posted by BOAC
do you agree there is little logic in allowing an autotrim to trim ANY tailplane into a setting where it is never normally going to go without saying something to someone and asking 'Are you sure?'
Sorry, but all I see is confusion about how trim works. Notwithstanding whether it is affected by FCS (Perpignan/AF447) or autopilot (Schiphol), as long as machine works properly and reliably, it
will prevent THS from going into places it isn't supposed to be going. When it malfunctions, it is up to pilots to use intelligence and compensate for the failing of what is basically mindless entity.
Originally Posted by PJ2
IIRC, the A320 auto-trim system on the Perpignan accident stopped trimming when the stall warning occurred,
IIRC, extreme alpha lead to rejection of ADCs and aeroplane reverting to some law were only available trim was manual, I'm not sure whether it was direct or abnormal alternate.
Originally Posted by PJ2
If they missed it "in the confusion", that is an indication of incompetence
Originally Posted by Oakape
I believe that the crew were of below average flying ability, were inadequately trained & had no business being in the flightdeck of a jet transport aircraft.
Whoa. I need to get oozlumistic here.
Folks, pilots trying to keep the nose up to stall and in it is something we have since there were pilots. Wolfgang Langewiesche described such a case seventy years ago. About eighty years ago, there was young cadet who spun his training glider into ground by holding the stick firmly against the back stop. Fortunately, low wing loading meant he hit with moderate RoD so survived, which was most unfortunate for those who were later caught in sights of his Me-109 over Spain or during the Battle of Britain. His name was Adolf Galland. Would you call him "incompetent" or state he was of "below average flying ability"?
Given enough aggravating circumstances, inappropriate reaction can happen to anyone. That is not to say "we can't do anything about it", trick is to know your aeroplane and know the medium you are flying through so well that when faced with emergency, you can say "Hey, I know how to deal with it" instead of letting the fear coming from inability to understand the predicament you have found yourself in cascade into panic.
While report is disappointingly thin on crews performance in the years preceding the fatal flight, I suspect that investigation did not uncover anything out of the ordinary that would be worth mentioning.
May issue of Aviation Safety World has interesting article. Its title is "Pathological Reactions". Just to give you a sample:
Originally Posted by Wayne Martin, Patrick Murray and Paul Bates
people expect that professional pilots — who
are generally well trained, very experienced
and presumably endowed with
the “right stuff ”15 — will nonchalantly,
competently and flawlessly deal with
critical emergencies to avoid disaster.
Unfortunately, this may not be the case.
Extremely high aircraft reliability
has become the norm, so official findings
after an aircraft accident or serious
incident more often are peppered with
human failings involving the pilots. In
some relatively recent fatal accidents,
the findings showed that flight crews
mishandled critical events and failed
to recover the aircraft [ASW, 8/12, p.
14; ASW, 6/10, p. 32; ASW, 3/10, p. 20;
ASW, 4/11, p. 46]. Typically, there was
some delay in acting, or incorrect action
taken, which exacerbated the problem.