A comment or two.
In the US at any rate the overall fatal accident rate for the Cirrus is significantly better than the rest of the GA fleet. The Cirrus pilot population is doing a far better job than average.
The pilot has little control where the aircraft lands once the chute has been pulled. However the aircraft lands essentially vertically and, in terms of the impact, under control. The energy on impact is reasonably predictable. If you were to run hundreds of random landing scenarios in built up areas I wonder how many would end up on roofs, or in back gardens or running down the side of buildings. In each case the collateral damage would probably been relatively self contained. On the other hand with respect to a conventional forced landing the pilot has a significant degree of control over the landing site. However the landing is not vertical and the energy will be dissipated along the total path required to bring the aircraft to a standstill. Even with a well judged forced landing the imprint will be significantly larger. With an ill judged forced landing the results are more random. The evidence, and my experience, is there are few pilots that can accurately manage a forced landing. The evidence is that in the heat of a real emergency forced landing are often managed a great deal more poorly than in the training scenario. We all dance on the head of a pin, but I wonder if there are some that shouldn't be as quick with their claims that they could consistently and accurately manage a forced landing.
In instrument conditions with low bases there are innumerable accounts of loss of control with spin in and high energy impact; read the accident reports. The results are always fatal and the collateral damage often significant. For some reasons the pictures of a twin that ran out of fuel in the overhead of my local airport always come to mind. The pilot succeeded in removing the roof of a large house and wiped out the entire garden. Thankfully he survived but the damage was memorable. Unfortunately there are much worse accounts.
Which takes me full circle as to whether Cirrus pilots take on missions they shouldn't because of the chute and whether they are flying an aircraft that is beyond their ability. Whether they are, or aren't, there can be little doubt they are doing more with their aircraft than the mass of the GA fleet. Most Cirrus pilots, in fact the vast majority, are owners. They use their aircraft to go places. They travel over distances. By necessity they are far more likely to expose themselves to more challenging flying and more variety of weather. Yet, they perform on average better than the GA fleet as a whole.
Pace on another thread talks about options. I hope I am a reasonably cautious pilot. I hesitate a lot flying a conventional single at night, in IMC with low bases or over water (outside of glide distance of land), I hesitate a lot less in a Cirrus and by a degree less again in a twin. Going to France this week in the Cirrus I would have gone the shortest distance over the channel (perhaps old habits die to hard) but as it was in a twin I happily opted for the longest crossing. So we all make choices and in my opinion the Cirrus offers better choices than a conventional single.
This thread is about debating how those choices are exercised, more than the circumstances of this accident which as yet we know very little. The choices which you or I might make are not the choices him or her over their might make, and the choices we bravely think we might make in the comfort of our sitting room may be very different from the way we actually perform when the chips are down, the engine stops for real for the very first time for when you are least expecting it to quit and the weather somehow doesn't seem as good as the last time you did a PFL with your instructor.
As I departed over the coast this week I thought to myself how wonderful it was to see a blue sky for a change. At 500 feet over the sea there was no horizon, I could just about see the sea glancing down and the only solution was to switch to instruments. The climb continued to FL65 by which time it was just possible to continue reliant on enjoying the view through the screen. With one engine an engine failure at any time would have been challenging, more challenging than I had anticipated moments earlier on the ground. I would have made that flight before I could fly on instruments because the conditions looked fine, but I know with the minimal instrument training I then had it would have required every ounce of my ability to complete that climb or do something else, there wouldn't have been anything left to handle an engine failure or some other emergency. Would I have pulled the chute? The moment the aircraft was ahead of me you bet your life I would! What would you have done? Are you in the comfort of your arm chair writing your post on this thread so confident that you would have handled the emergency differently and the outcome would have been better?