The essence of Safety Management, now so beloved of all Regulators, is that when you identify a flight safety sensitive hazard you do something about it very promptly indeed, preferably remove it. (Avoid or Mitigate are the other 2 options, if Remove is not available.)
Obviously the cowling latches are such a hazard. "If it can go wrong, it will", and should never have been designed that way in the first place.
If EASA were not the useless bunch of whatsits that they are, shackled by EU Commission bureaucracy, some incompetence and political infighting, effective action would have already been completed to force Airbus to design within, say, 60 days a modification to eliminate this hazard totally and produce an AD to instal the mod, with all the necessary maintenance instructions, that must be complied with within another 90 days by all operators. Meanwhile some robust mitigation is needed.
All costs to be reimbursed by Airbus, which produced this blatant Murphy in the first place.
The cowling is not safe because thousands of flights take place every day without a problem. It's unsafe because a few flights have departed with the cowling improperly fastened, creating a hazard to flight safety, and it could happen again.
Ah well, let's not dream. When someone gets killed, if that ever happens, is time enough to get excited about it, in aviation's traditional way.