When John Farley posts, we must all take special note.
I hope my post here which I've been knocking around for the last hour or two doesn't detract too far from what he posted in between times:
That was interesting information A and C and as you have been around these parts longer than most I imagine you are very sure of it. I apologise if the information was available elsewhere in this thread.
I thought others had shown diagrams including one appearing in Canadian incident report that explained the position of latches as quite clearly standing proud when not secure ? BOAC reminded us in
his post #656 that there is a risky but still visible half open latch situation where "they will protrude about one inch underneath the cowling . This is the normal condition of the latches after maintenance opens the cowling". He pointed out the Canadian Report which includes this photo:
The interim report is quite clear that there is photographic evidence of G-EUOE leaving the stand with unsecured latches - so if it isn't quite as I read from BOAC and from the Canadian photo then that's worth knowing about. Nevertheless AAIB say LHR stand photos show the unlocked position plainly enough, so the walk-around error is the same, isn't it, unless you are insisting now that unlatched cowls the way BA and others set them are totally unnoticeable except when the aircraft rocks slightly during pushback, or when engine starts or during taxy and that's when the evidence photos must have been taken?
If it is so difficult to spot until things start moving then all the more reason for walk-arounds to be bombproof everytime?
Perhaps A and C highlights a new risk that BOAC didn't mention, but
kenjaDROP's post #641 then did i.e. that he thought it possible for maintenance to open the cowling and then click those latches back flush with the cowling even though they aren't locked? And that then the only way to notice it during the walk-around inspection is for someone to routinely thump the cowls or prise an anti-static rubber screwdriver type implement to test the latches are working? (I did see that mentioned quite some pages back as an old-times aviation procedure not necessarily for this type).
Sillert VI, I apologise for my use of language on banging heads - I was rebounding off that head-banging smiley used to comment against my earlier post. I am not really talking about hanging any one individual out to dry because there but for the grace of God and all that, but I'd have thought a 14,000 hour captain would be on top of this rather than prone to go with the modern aviation flow which NigelOnDraft talked about. From what he said, there seemed to be questionable, unconventional and inconsistent transfer of risk going on as the norm relying on individual pilot "judgement".
So I was rather talking metaphorically about
all pilots needing to up their game on walk-around inspections if even at this stage they are still minded that it is an engineering problem. Not their job to be the back-stop on this kind of thing, maybe? The pilot's job/role may have been well and truly messed with over the years, but walk-around checks most definitely are still very much on the captain's accountability list, aren't they? That's the disconnect which is most surprising to me and might need reconnecting or banging into quite a few heads IMO.
All aircraft types have their quirks but this isn't really a quirk unless maintenance have modified the latches so they don't behave per the book - should not a pilot be able to name and locate with his eyes closed every single quick release panel on external skin of the airframe (and some). And if any is easily removable or unlockable without tools, surely each and every external one should be inspected on walk-around? I would expect them all to be in the FCOM external checks.
We have heard lots about how difficult it is to complete those checks in the time available especially with multi-tasking on the ramp. But how the captain actually ensures each panel latch is inspected immediately prior to flight is a whole different question. Ensure it he or she must however.
One thing is clear: the captain must not simply abdicate that accountability to some inanimate or abstract such as the SMS agreed with his employer or with the airport or the ground handler or maintenance department. The captain surely must remain consciously accountable and yes, always be prepared to testify convincingly that the system works, else he just shouldn't go?