Unstable approach identification and handling
Some years back, an Indonesian registered Boeing 737 approached too fast and was never stabilised while attempting to land in good weather at Jogkarta. The aircraft was nearly 80 knots fast over the fence with flaps still at Flap 5. Despite numerous GPWS warnings the captain pressed on regardless and over-ran the runway at high speed and caught fire killing several aboard.
If ever there was a perfect example of the dangers of an unstabilised approach, this was it. In simulator training there is a great deal of emphasis on stabilised approaches; and so there should be. Having said that, it is all very well to read up on the varying dangers associated with an unstable approach and think you have got it covered. But, there is nothing like a demonstration to new pilots of the final consequences. As the old saying goes - A picture is worth a thousand words. And what better place to demonstrate than in a simulator.
For captains who may have become complacent and with new pilots converting to the 737 - especially cadets - the simulator instructor should consider demonstrating what happened to that aircraft using the same configuration and speeds. At the very least, new pilots see a graphic demonstration of the consequences and how at any stage in the approach and landing flare, the captain could have gone around but refused to do so, despite entreaties from the first officer who did little to prevent the accident.
With a runway set at 7500 ft at sea level it takes less than five minutes to set up the simulator at 1500 ft on final at 240 knots and Flaps 5 and make the approach. Aim to be 210 knots over the fence like the accident aircraft. And then float until touch down. That five minutes is sheer gold to young cadets going directly into the RH seat of jet transports because now they can see the potential consequences of pressing on with an unstable approach.
The above suggestion becomes pertinent when, according to an article in Flight International, the European Aviation Safety agency (EASA) has proposed the mandatory installation of automated cockpit systems to reduce the risk of runway over-run. EASA is quoted as saying runway excursions were the fourth most frequent accident category for commercial air transport in Europe for over a decade.
Experience has shown that the ideal of the first officer as a monitor to alert the captain to the potential danger of a unstabilised approach, has its limitations - particularly if he has never personally seen a seriously unstable approach. Simulator training as described above would be one solution to be considered and at negligible cost.