Folks,
Anybody who thinks the CASA problems will be solved by changes at the top are seriously misguided. Indeed, I would suggest that Directors and other senior management, as they come and go, become captive of the culture of CASA.
And what is that culture ----- a long time CASA insider, now a severe critic, refers to the "Iron Ring", the long standing middle of the organisation that perpetuates the "CASA Culture". I agree with him, and the answer is not just another new Director, firing McCormick ( even if, in my opinion, he must go) will not solve any problems.
It would be the post of all time to try to give my explanation of what I think the problem is, but in short, the organisation does not even know what it's job really is --- the administration of aviation safety regulations for the promotion of acceptable safety outcomes.
Since the days of DCA, and the days of the two airline agreement, the underlying culture has been am unwritten assumption that the job is to manage the aviation sector in Australia. In fact, if you happen to be an AOC or CAR30/CASR 145 approval holder --- to micromanage aviation businesses.
In recent years, this underlying assumed raison d'etra has seen virtually untrammeled development, particularly since 2007 ---- although the foundations goes back to DCA. In recent years the "Iron Ring" has been unconstrained. It is not just the old guard --- with honorable exceptions, a certain type of person is attracted to "regulator" jobs, particularly the "enforcement" part of the organisation. Recruits to the organisationthe soak up the culture like a dry sponge.
Creamie has taken me to task for believing there is a potential political solution, but what other solution is there, given the magnitude of the task of changing the culture. I know the shortcomings of the political system as well as most, but I also know that when a department becomes too much of a political embarrassment, politicians will act.
Have we got to that stage yet, with CASA?? I don't know, but it is very close. Another visit from the FAA would be a huge embarrassment, maybe that would be the straw that broke the camel's back.
Sunfish,
Several of your recent posts have really surprised me.
I know of the matters that Kharon, Thorn Bird and others refer to,and it is real. Amongst the "small jet" FOI's, the so called "type specialists" have, in my opinion, very limited turbine experience ---- but that does not stop them demanding wholesale changes to AFM SOP's and Checklists, on the basis of said limited experience and, in my opinion, a continually demonstrated severe lack of basic background aeronautical education, in my opinion, they presume to know more than the collective experience of the FAA, the manufacturers and Flight Safety (in the case of Cessna).
These FOI's, in my opinion, completely ignore CAR 138, which requires an operator to comply with the AFM, which is part of the fundamental certification of the aeroplane, and in the view of most lawyers I know, cannot be changed without the agreement of the Type Certificate holder and the NAA that issues the Type Certificate.
These same FOI's are, in my opinion, demanding pilots adopt flying techniques that are dangerous, by adopting a method of interpretation of required performance that has long since been abandoned, as a result of loss of life in aircraft accidents. But, in my opinion, such is the lack of knowledge of the individual FOIs, and the lack of corporate knowledge in CASA, such outmoded and dangerous techniques are enforced.
What Kharon has had to say about the Skymaster/Avtex case, including the AAT, is also correct, that was a travesty of justice. The transcripts make amazing reading, when you read the judgement, it is almost as if your are reading twp separate cases. Under examination in the witness box, a number of pilot witnesses, under oath, denied the statements CASA presented in their names were their views. At the last moment, CASA withdrew their "star witness", the FOI who was largely responsible for the above mentioned statements.
Nevertheless, the CASA statements were accepted.
Amazingly, in this case, the AAT accepted a version of the flight in icing rules that means that no aircraft that is not equipped for flight in forecast icing conditions can even take off ---- that is, flying under, over or around doesn't count --- you stay on the ground.
For Avtex, CASA denied that a new Ops. Manual, that was a condition on the AOC, was accepted by CASA, even when the AOC condition was removed after the manual was presented to CASA, CASA demanded changes had been made, and CASA FOIs conducted checks based on the new manuals.
Thus, CASA claimed all sorts of non-compliance with the "old manual", of course there were non-compliance's, because at CASA demand that a new manual be developed that, amongst other things, covered two pilot operations, which the old manual did not???
CASA successfully convinced the AAT that the AOCM requirements for RPT license renewal checks applied to Avtex, when it was clearly a non-scheduled operator, and both the old and the new manual complied precisely with the CAO, andin the case of the "old" manual, had done for years. That resulted in findings that a number of pilot had not been properly qualified. This became even sillier, when a training pilot did a renewal based on the old manual, with a CASA FOI, that renewal was later claimed by CASA to not be a valid renewal, because it didn't comply with the new manual.
And so it goes on ---- without a major cultural change ??? ---- we are already in very dangerous territory.
Tootle pip!!
Last edited by LeadSled; 27th May 2013 at 14:57.