----- aren't "children of the magenta line", by any chance??
Ham Phisted,
Clearly, you are unaware that the above expression is in common use in discussions of increasingly obvious shortcomings in current training systems and some operational systems.
Increasingly, it is obvious that those who know nothing but modern flight decks are showing, all too often, an inability to handle scenarios "outside the box".
In large part, the problem is often operators (and the regulators who approve) with increasingly complex SOPs and a punitive management approach to perceived non-compliance with SOPs. SOPs that are all about company CYA, and quite divorced from any reasonable version of "best practice".
It is a particular problem in Australia, with a regulator (CASA) that demands "Check Lists" that are, in fact, procedures lists, not vital actions check lists, at all. And Flying Operations Inspectors who have no respect for the AFM and the collected experience of the manufacturers, as reflected in the typical modern AFM.
Back to the incident, if the problem in this case turns out to be cowls that were not latched, I do hope that BA engineering and operations take a reasonable approach.
"Off with their heads" is not a reasonable approach. The way Qantas handled VH-OJH going off the end at Bangkok is a good example of how to handle a systemic problem, without destroying anybody's career. There was no shortage of proponents "fire the bastards", but "Reason" prevailed.
Looking through the incident record in the public domain, and the clear design problem of the latches, not limited to being hard to see during a walk-around, it is about time for an AD to fix the problem, once and for all.
Based on the published record, the basic design fails the "Reason" test.
I note that you haven't bothered to address the entirely legitimate examples I raised, where immediate and substantial departures from SOP's saved the day.