So far we appear to have a Toulouse product with a questionable design of cowling latches and possibly a maintenance organisation which, because it was not ordered to, ignores the lessons inherent in recommendation 4.4 of the UK AAIB investigation into G-OBMM.
Does it have to be made compulsory by regulators for engineering departments to do something sensible like NOT affecting the airworthiness of 2/2 powerplant in the same procedure?
A major UK operator was pushing 737s onto the line, post DUAL MCD checks and the Daily being signed up on the same page by the same authorised signatory, in the early 2000s and no one seemed to see it as cause for concern!
When will we ever learn from the mistakes of the day before yesterday? Or has commercial pressure to wrap double engine inspections into the same event been assessed as a statistically acceptable risk?
I have every sympathy for the unfortunate line engineers who may have to carry the can for this whilst those higher in the food chain who set the policy slink unseen around their ivory towers. It will take a brave inquiry to hang them out to dry!
