I guess the investigation is continuing?
Question raised by others: Was RWY visual at MDA (or even MDA+50ft? or were they attempting MDA as DA which is controversial to many!)? It would appear that it may not have been at 550 when the EGPWS went off, and during the precious few seconds between 550ft and MDA (465ft), while the PF was disengaging AP and autothrottle and peering through the rain presumably still looking for the RWY, the aircraft also appears to have started a 1200fps descent.
Definitely points to company training, respect for MDA and use of VDP on NPAs (if, how, etc) and especially human factors.
In fact, apart from what else they might have hit had they actually managed to perform an aborted landing from below MDA (even 150ft less pilot reaction time), the quantum of the MDA is not really so relevant in this case. It's the fact that go-around wasn't performed at or above MDA given specific conditions and late change in visibility, and the apparent lack of command (over all flight instruments and aircraft attitude, descent rate, etc), monitoring and general CRM during that last critical phase below 550ft.
I wonder how much pressure there is to perform despite all odds (eg, WX, VIS) and actually land the aircraft and deliver pax?
Awaiting the final report with interest.