Any comment, and I mean any comment, about runway unsighted @ 150 feet (unless conducting cat11 or cat111) is call for an immediate go around.
Scenario, if one of the crew members makes a statement that he can't see the runway, and the other crew continues, exactly what use to you is the unsighted pilot? He may as well not be on the flight deck.
By continuing descent after that statement the unsighted pilot is rendered
useless to you as a PM. Who in their right mind would willingly render
their PM useless to them?
Two crew is two crew, and as such requires two brains two different points of view, believe me you want your PM to be on the ball actively monitoring,
supporting, challenging you etc. when one crew member states" I can't see the runway" @ 150, that is as big of a red flag you are ever going to get.
If this scenario were in a simulator, and you could flight freeze the
situation, and ask a couple of open questions of each crew member, then they would collectively decide that the only option at 150 feet was a go around.
First off, I extracted that bit from a longer post. Second: good points in re CRM.
Third: "Who in their right mind?"
In order to "get your mind right" you have to buy into the culture that has evolved in the best airlines, where CRM has become a byword and a core competency. Your organization has to embed and nurture that cultural assumption, or it won't sustain over time.
I used to teach CRM, but the truth is that I was a reluctant convert in the 80's as it got emphasized more heavily in my organization. It wasn't until I learned the simple expedient of "hey, Bubba" as my entry level means of breaking the cockpit gradient with some of our more crusty aircraft commanders that I became a believer. Good thing I became a believer. A year later I got a "hey Bubba" froma co-pilot that probably saved us from flying into the sea. I once got a "hey Bubba" from an aircrewman that helped the two of us up front avoid a wheels up landing at an unfamiliar field.
CRM didn't come from Orville and Wilbur. The lessons learned that led to it were written in blood. While I don't disagree that the info to date show us a crew with poor discipline, sending out undisciplined crews is a profound organizational issue, as is "getting pilots' minds right" regarding how team work, CRM, and cockpit gradients (and adhering to SOP) all fit together in professional aviation outfits.
Sorry for the long post. The root causes (at the human factors level) in this one smell of supervisory error, and numerous deficiencies in organizational climate.