Captain Bloggs, with due regard to your experiences, the performance problem began well before stall, in terms of aircraft performance and sustained pitch error. I think you switched topics in the middle of your point there. Correcting the initial pitch error, and the 3000 foot altitude error is well within reason using performance instruments to detect and call for correction of a flying out of desired parameters.
To address the second part, post stall pitch error: once again, the performance seen by the PM would again be manifested by what was displayed on the attitude indicator. (Based on the report identifying the pitch at various times via the FDR data). Granted, since neither seems to have registered "we are stalled" and latched on to "hmm, nose up, yet we are falling" as an indicator of that condition, any error correction for what is an untrained (recover from actual stall) flight condition relies on putting a number of pieces of the puzzle together. That didn't occur for whatever reason. If you feel lack of seeing the flight control position contributed to that, OK, I'll stop arguing, since most of what I flew was conventional controls, not FBW.
In defense of the PM, and in support of your point, once stalled:
the lack of confidence in airspeed display and possiblly lack of training in stall recovery (rather than the stall prevention) puts the PM behind the aircraft, catching up, and in a night/IMC stall recovery situation that the PF has put him into, and that their collective CRM mis-steps have allowed to happen. The errors are crew errors, not just PF errors.
As PM, even when he realized he is over his head and called the captain, isn't his attitude indicator still showing him pitch errors?
"Lower your nose. Your pitch is too high."
Those are inputs/commands used to advise a PF to correct a pitch error. Even if you don't know what the other stick is doing, you can see what is wrong with the pitch and call for a correction. Is that not pretty basic CRM?
The related topic in re your second point -- why the audio stall warning (a secondary indication of pitch still being wrong) was apparently not factored into his correction inputs to the PF. My original guess was that A/S being whack (both seem to have acknowledged that) leads either or both pilots in the seat discounting mentally a stall warning as spurious ... again, I am guessing on that, but it does fit the SA problem. It gets compounded when they report to the Captain when he arrives. Seems to have provided a bit of misdirection as he tried to make sense of what they were doing, or not doing.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 15th May 2013 at 15:26.