On Friday of the same week in Canberra at a meeting of some, but not all CASA executive managers, the mood was one of outright revolt, with complete rejection of Byron’s announcements. Byron was not present and it is understood no minutes were kept.
Three separate sources say that ‘the feeling of the meeting,’ rich in expletives, was expressed in terms of “We are the safety experts, we’ll tell the bastards what the rules are, and what the policy is, and if they don’t like it, we’ll run them out of the industry.”
The meeting “agreed” that all the reform program changes put in place in 1996/1999 were a grave mistake, and they would put that right because the Government had “got it wrong”.
Obviously interesting times still lay ahead. In fact the meeting also “decided” that in the face of concerted opposition, Byron would back down and they would have a free run; that the DOTARS and the Minister would not stand in their way, so there would be no more “pandering to the industry” in terms of consultation.
One attendee at the meeting declared that all the changes the PAP had put in place were ‘not Government policy,’ notwithstanding that the PAP briefed the Minister monthly.
Only a few days after the meeting, Byron called in three of the executives without involving his Deputy and Chief Operating Officer Bruce Gemmell. The three, who left CASA almost immediately, included Bill McIntyre, CASA’s (then) Executive Manager of Standards who had overseen the controversial rule rewrite.
A month after the meeting, on 24 November 2004, Byron issued two directives to Gemmell, with immediate effect. They were clear and uncompromising, and again spelt out the goals of the program using now-familiar phrases.
Directive 16/2004 – Development of Regulations and the Regulatory Framework -set out to establish guiding principles for the development of the regulatory framework and to provide clear guidance for the development of proposed aviation safety regulations.
The regulations were to be developed on the basis of addressing known or likely safety risks, with each proposed regulation to be assessed against the contribution it would make to aviation safety.
Wherever possible, the CASRs were to be drafted to specify the safety outcome required, unless, in the interests of safety and to address known or likely aviation safety risks, detailed requirements were to be presented.
This is exactly what EASA rules deliver, and is why the EASA committee recommended to Byron that adopting EASA maintenance rules would achieve another of his objectives (published elsewhere) which was:
“Wherever possible, aviation safety regulations are to be developed within a two tier regulatory framework comprising the Civil Aviation Act and the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASRs), supported by advisory material that details acceptable means of compliance with the CASRs, together with appropriate guidance material.”
Manuals of Standards (MOSs) were to be developed only where there was a clear requirement, on the basis of safety, to mandate standards that for the purpose of clarity should not be contained in the Regulations.
Notably, the CASA lawyers had emphasised that a MOS would have to be referred to in the regulations, and would therefore become a third tier of legislation – highly undesirable and work-intensive when a MOS will contain material that needs regular updating in practice.
The content of proposed MOSs must also be assessed against the contribution made to aviation safety, and a MOS must only contain such standards as are clearly authorised by a particular regulation and must not be used as a vehicle for promulgating advisory material and other information.
And all proposed CASA Parts and MOSs were to be assessed against the guiding principles.
Directive 17/2004 – Regulatory Advisory Panels – required Regulatory Advisory Panels to be established in relation to each CASR Part under development, and the work of the panels to be separate from and additional to the existing consultative arrangements through the Standards Consultative Committee.
The RAPs were to advise the CEO on the proposed content of each CASR Part and, where applicable, the associated MOS, prior to publication of a discussion paper, NPRM or submission to the Minister, in relation to that Part.
The Advisory Panels would comprise:
- Chair of the Standards Consultative Committee
- Project Manager for the relevant Part.
- Manager from the relevant Standards branch (nominated by EM Standards)
- Member of the SCC (Nominated by the SCC)
- Member of the ASF (Nominated by the ASF)
- Inspector / Manager from the relevant area of Compliance (Nominated by EM Compliance)
- Independent member of the aviation industry (nominated by the CEO)
- Member of the Office of Legal Counsel (nominated by General Counsel)
- Representative of the Department of Transport and Regional Services
- Adviser from the Office of the CEO (Nominated by the CEO)
The Regulatory Advisory Panels, created after the Senate’s disallowance of Part 47, did useful work. James Kimpton chaired the only two sessions that were convened, which sorted out difficulties with the very light aircraft amendments to Part 21 and Part 137 dealing with Aerial Agriculture. The third dealt with Part 99 (drug and alcohol testing.)
The directives, which were fully in line with (then) Minister Anderson’s comprehensive charter letter to Mr Byron on his appointment in November 2003, came shortly after the departure of the three executives. It sent a strong message to other officials still pushing for the mountain of regulation that had been under preparation since CASA set aside the industry consultation input of the PAP in the late 1990s. The directives represented a 180-degree turn away from “prescriptive” regulations whose development over the past six years had ploughed ahead in the face of vigorous industry opposition.
Among the remaining symptoms of substantial internal resistance to CASA reform, had been embedded contempt for the reform process, continued antipathy to the concept of industry consultation, the determination of CASA to walk away from modern regulatory frameworks and guidelines, a growing confrontational mentality that has further damaged industry relations, and an apparent absence of acknowledgement of, and compliance with, international obligations.