can anyone explain how 1000s of projects - each with requirements that are vital to get right - will practically be managed at the govt interface?
The challenge when developing the initiative I spoke of was not so much the Contractor/MoD interface, but defining and managing he interface between projects and equipments. At least MoD tries to do the former, often successfully. The latter was ditched long ago (the underlying detail in the Haddon-Cave report and many before it). Nevertheless, the Management Plan was formally approved in 2001 and works. It is a case of implementation and will. But.....
what level do you actually manage the goco at? who exactly will be the intelligent customer to set the requirements and accept against them with the goco?
As you correctly imply, the scale of Gray’s task is made difficult by the numbers, with skills, he’ll need to manage it. Traditionally, the method of retaining staff is to reorganise and allow the new regime a 2 or 3 year period during which they can be over-manned. When cuts are proposed, another reorganisation is planned. It is a self perpetuating system. But this time the decision to chop posts has already been announced and partly implemented. As for skills, the Chief Engineer chopped funding and did away with the skills in the early 90s, a policy replicated by CDP in 1996 in MoD(PE); so few, if any, are properly trained these days. Luckily, any reputable Design Authority, and most Design Custodians, will regard this as second nature. The down side is that they, too, have been dumbed down as the necessary contracts have been pretty scarce since Alcock’s policy. But I think they will have retained more expertise than MoD (who retained none!), which is one reason why I think this a sensible move. (20 years ago I wouldn’t have said this, as the situation was recoverable).
However, there are certain companies I’d prefer not to have such authority and delegation, so it is important the mandated rules for selection and delegation are followed (whereby the delegated, named person at the contractor is an MoD appointment, not a company appointment). Again, this means implementing the only Def Stan covering this. I emphasise this point because it is a practical stumbling block. Once senior staff realise the contradiction, whereby this mandated Def Stan has been cancelled without replacement, they’ll procrastinate for ages to avoid any implied criticism of those who are anti-efficiency. In the 2001 initiative I mentioned, they waited a few years after approval, then changed the name of the initiative and all postholder titles. I gave the presentation at Shrivenham which led to approval, and then sat in frustration as VSOs, DEC and, especially, the MoD Integration Authority, faffed about over their own status. Anyone reading the Plans can see why they were concerned. Their very existence was called into question. There wasn’t the political will then to carry it through more widely, but Gray may just have that backing. By the way, that initiative ensures retention of key Service posts by funding them from the programme, not from central funds (or whoever pays Servicemen). That was a key aspect.
how many staff & what skills will that take?
How many depends on what skills/experience. The days are long gone when an equipment project manager in PE would have 60 projects and 500 contracts on the go at any one time. It is because of this historical fact that I agree that DE&S is grossly overstaffed, but the current cuts are not being made for the correct reason. As I said above, this initiative must go hand in hand with a fundamental change in recruitment and personnel policies.