ExSp33db1rd: Wrt "When in doubt look out of the window and fly the aeroplane."
Always & indeed!
Automation, when used correctly & appropriately, and when one understands it (
though more especially when one understands its limitations) can be excellent at helping get the aircraft safely & smoothly down to a position where the remainder of the approach can be conducted 'visually' (
i.e. without further reference to instruments,... aside from keeping an occasional eye upon ones ASI 
).
I would add that, imho, the avionics in the B737 are actually quite slick, i.e. especially so when compared to, say, the B757/B767 (
they being the only other Boeing types that I have flown), and certainly so in a B737-NG if it's been fitted with all the bells & whistles (
ours even have a HUD/HGS).
BUT, one still needs to keep on top of it and be able to recognise when the automation is going wrong... and then, it's click click (
autopilot off) + click click (
auto-throttle off).
And by way of examples, I'm sure we've all seen plenty of approaches wherein people get themselves 'high' as a result of failing to recognise that the VNAV PATH simply isn't working (
regardless of what might programmed in the FMC)... and worse, get themselves 'low' when the aircraft silently drops out of VNAV PATH into VNAV SPD though, even on a VOR approach (
in a B737NG, at least) you will then likely get a "GLIDESLOPE" aural alert (
though for the life of me I can't see why Boeing didn't make that call-out say "GLIDEPATH", which would be a technically more accurate call-out based upon what one is following vertically).
Fwiw, amongst other places, we use the 'automatics' for non-precision approaches into Kathmandu (VOR R02) and also into Kabul (RNAV R29)... and both can give one a few uneasy moments and / or even royally f**k-you-up (
especially due to 'operator' error!)... but it's how todays companies want it done!... the 'skill' is recognising (
=experience) when it's going wrong and having a strategy & ability to deal with it (
be that to either continue or to go-around)!
You might also consider that in todays litigious society and / or where the 'no-blame culture' is now very often highly punitive (
it being a state of play which many companies impose, therein paying veritable 'lip service' to the true ethos of 'safety') which leads to pilots being somewhat opposed to actually 'flying the aeroplane' and therein becoming a slave to the automatics.
Fwiw, I (
too) apologise to all for what might seem to be thread creep but, as a Captain on that type, I have a most definite interest in how / why this crash happened and, reading some of the previous posts, there seemed (
to me) to be some 'confusion' out there about various aspects of the operation and abilities of the B737NG, both in terms of altimeter setting procedures and also wrt the modes (
and limits therein) of how one might fly a non-precision approach, in this aircraft type.
For the benefit of all, this video presentation is legend: