PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - FMS vulnerabilities highlighed at Net Security conference
Old 12th Apr 2013, 20:40
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Ian W
 
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Please forgive my ignorance but I thought aviation systems were among the most protected If not the most protected) on the planet!

Don't national aviation authorities insist on an aircraft's software systems impenetrable when they certify a new aircraft and then require it to continue being impenetrable?
They run a whole battery [cough] of certification tests. The problem is building the test scripts and if nobody thought something was possible then - their will be no test for it. This takes us into the realm of positive and negative testing. Positive testing is making sure that the system does everything it is meant to. This is pretty tedious stuff - go through the functional requirement and check everything works as advertised be clever with values on the line above and below etc.

Negative testing is everything else. That is a LOT and very expensive to test. So someone has to scope the testing. Obviously, nobody thought that people would be trying to 'get into' the system over the comms links. So nobody specified any defensive code or testing of defensive code so none was written.

Many systems end up fortified in an area where people are sure things could be mishandled - say flight crew mistypes. But no cross checking on ACARS inputs or perhaps SATCOM communications. When these things were developed back in the 70's they were very esoteric and hacking was something you wore a jacket for. Now these links look really primitive and simple to break into. Worse, the hardware and software architecture inside the aircraft seems to have been built for cost and weight saving and not security. Like other things recently we may see the equivalent of armored boxes appear in software. But don't expect much to be publicized.
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