Kharon said: I can't see that the Senate has any option but to call in the DPP and closely examine the events subsequent to the ditching.
Or the Senator’s can directly refer the matter to the AFP for investigation as that is inevitably what the CDPP would have to do anyway as they do not have investigatory powers. DJ (and probably many others by the sound of it?), besides taking civil action, can as a private citizen refer a brief to the CDPP for their consideration.
I would say on the balance of probabilities and all the solid documented and verified evidence brought forward by the inquiry so far, I believe any good prosecutor could mount a prosecution for proving numerous breaches of the TSI Act, the CAA Act, the Commonwealth Criminal Code Act by various parties within FF and dare I say the bureau. Note: It would also appear that there has been serious obfuscation/abuse of a parliamentary process.
However before there is a prosecution the CDPP need to task the AFP with conducting a full and comprehensive investigation (i.e. you can’t just skip a step or two like FF invariably do) as per the AFP charter and the HOCOLEA AGIS (2011).
One would have to say that the AFP’s task has been simplified by the work of the Senate RRAT committee inquiry’s gathered evidence so far, however perhaps some suggestions on where to start could be helpful??
Perhaps the first place the AFP should start is to take a look at the CASA Accident Investigation Report (CAIR 09/3) that FF released under the MOU and section 32 of the TSI Act. This would appear to be the script that FF wanted the bureau to run with. It is also apparent that the bureau acquiesced with this script by many statements made by Beaker and in various AQONs/Supp submissions throughout this inquiry. Here’s an example:
From Senator X’s question 4 (written QONs for the 15/02/2013 public hearing):
4. Did the ATSB think to obtain some independent analysis of fatigue levels from another investigation bureau/aviation authority? Were you aware that CASA asked the UK Civil Aviation Authority to analyse the fatigue levels of the crew?
ATSB response: The ATSB has several human factors specialists. During the course of investigation activities, the ATSB will on a case-by-case basis obtain information and advice from external specialists in a specific human factors area, such as fatigue, when provision of this advice is necessary or will enhance the ATSB’s understanding of an issue. With regard to this investigation, the ATSB did not obtain any independent analysis of fatigue levels, nor did it think it was necessary to do so.
The ATSB was not previously aware that the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) had provided CASA with an analysis of the fatigue levels associated with the accident flight (which was provided in the email titled ‘Air Amb Supp’ from a UK CAA officer to a CASA officer on 11 December 2009). The ATSB notes that the analysis did not appear to warrant inclusion in CASA’s Accident Investigation Report.
Note: It is simply extraordinary that Beaker essentially shrugs his shoulders at the fact that FF chose to barely even acknowledge in their report the comprehensive FRMS Special Audit Report compiled by Ben Cook a human factors expert, excerpts from CAIR 09/3:
And this:
It would also appear that in the spirit of the MOU ‘parallel investigations’ that the bureau, maybe due to lack of resources, accepted the findings and evidence gathered by the FF investigative team and subsequently didn’t deem it necessary to explore the veracity of the FF CAIR 09/3 review/analysis of certain documented evidence. Perhaps the following highlights one example of this:
From the FF constructed history of taped transcript pg 7 of CAIR 09/3:
0801 UTC NADI ATC provides the aircraft with the METAR for YSNF issued at 0630 ZULU. This was then updated with an Auto SPECI for Norfolk issued at 0800 ZULU. Wind 290 at 08 Knots cloud overcast (OVC) at one thousand one hundred ft AGL, 21ºCand the dewpoint was 19º C and the QNH Norfolk 1012.
Then from the 4 corners transcript:
MICK QUINN: In review when you look at the actual weather report that was issued, the actual cloud base was not at 6,000 feet. It was at 600 feet.
That indicates to Dominic, it reinforces his mental picture, that the forecast still is as it was, it's even better than what it was when he got the original forecast when he departed.
MARTIN DOLAN: That's not one that I am familiar with at the level of detail in the report so ...
GEOFF THOMPSON: So it might be a mistake.
MARTIN DOLAN: It, it may well be a mistake. I'll have to take a look at that.
GEOFF THOMSON: And he did.
Last Friday the ATSB acknowledged Dominic James received incorrect weather report from Fiji and changed its report.
DOMINIC JAMES: If I'd been told that there was cloud at 600 feet, even given the fact that I suspected the automatic system was overstating the weather at Norfolk, I would've gone to Fiji.
Note: This clearly shows that not only did the ATSB make a mistake but the CASA investigators neglected to include what the “0801 UTC NADI ATC” actually reported for the 0630 METAR, instead skipping to the 0800 Auto SPECI details.
Do we honestly believe that the bureau investigators, without FF involvement in this investigation, would have missed such an elementary and critical point on the erroneously transmitted 0630 METAR cloud base? Maybe the omission by the FF author of CAIR 09/3 was an honest mistake but it is something that remains outstanding and needs to be explored.
So maybe the AFP could start with CAIR 09/3 and ask why it appears the document has either been doctored or edited to suit some kind of self-interest direction from FF executive? And has this ultimately led to the integrity and veracity of the bureau’s investigation and report being severely compromised?