Hi Folks,
Sorry this is a little late but I was ‘cream crackered’ on arriving back home last night and opted for bed instead.
I think Friday was a very good day for the Defence – not quite a Valentine’s Massacre but somewhere close ! I apologise if this summary is rather long but I think it is very important that, if you are to understand the ‘big picture’, you will need some of the finer detail. This summary was condensed from 14 pages of handwritten notes!
Spot and Sue are in good spirits and continue to appreciate your kind words and messages of support through Pprune. Keep it coming. Monday is the start of week 4!
Dick
SUMMARY FOR FRIDAY 14th FEBRUARY 2003
A Sqn. Ldr. board member has taken over as the senior member. The board is now comprised of 6 members and the JA.
Craig Penrice (test pilot) continued as expert defence witness under examination from Mike Jones QC.
Craig stated that the eyewitnesses all reported seeing the aircraft on an east to west track at various points to the SE side of Ben McDui. The most easterly sighting was some 9km east of the Prosecution’s descent line. Their theory being that the aircraft followed a straight line (heading 350 degrees) from top of descent to impact.
Earlier in the CM a ‘rule of thumb’ had been introduced explaining that pilots use 10% of their rate of descent to gauge a point at which to commence a levelling off. Using the criteria in this case, an aircraft descending to 4000 ft (at 4000 ft per minute) would be reducing it’s rate of descent passing 4400 ft. However, from the information produced by the Allen’s Hill Radar, the aircraft were still descending at 4000 ft per minute when the cockpit indicated altitude would be 4200 ft on Regional Pressure Setting (even this figure would be in lag of the real altitude). Craig said this would probably indicate that the pilot had no intention of levelling off and could clearly see the ground, allowing continued descent to low level. This compares with an earlier descent towards Leuchars which was observed as being half the descent rate towards Ben McDui. Craig said that this was the more appropriate rate of descent for aircraft descending, in formation, in IMC.
The Prosecution then commenced his cross-examination by asking questions about Craig’s flying experience. In short, it is considerable – he has flown the F14, F15, F16, F18, Tornado, Jaguar, Lightning, Hawk, Mig 29 and Eurofighter (to mention the main fast jets) plus at least 20 other types including helicopters. Thereafter it became difficult to follow the Prosecution’s line of questioning, which has been a feature of this case. Craig was questioned on his role as a test pilot in what seemed unnecessary detail.
Then there followed confused questions about his experience at low level, particularly display flying, with emphasis on crowd lines and crowd safety. Frankly, we couldn’t see where this was leading – and we never found out.
The Prosecution then tried to discredit eyewitness’s ability to gauge speed, distance, heading and height of aircraft from the ground. Craig said that track could sometimes be difficult to assess unless aircraft flew directly over the witness. We know from previous evidence that this happened to two of the witnesses (who happened to be standing together). We are led to believe that the Court has yet to hear evidence from another eyewitness for the Defence. With regard to witness assessment of heading, Craig said that ± 30 degrees would be normal.
The Prosecution line of questioning then concentrated on the fallibility of eyewitnesses’ statements. Craig made it very clear that although certain elements of any eyewitness’s statements may be fallible, this should not lead to what they saw being entirely discounted.
The Prosecution then went off on another thread implying that witnesses had seen Tornados (rather than F15s), as these were the only other possible aircraft in LFA 14 in the same approximate time period. Craig pointed out that these Tornados had landed at Lossiemouth 30 minutes before the last radar contact was seen on the F15s. It is also known that the Tornados were flying in a 2 mile trail whereas the F15s were seen by all witnesses in close formation. Despite this compelling evidence the Prosecuting Officer, for reasons known only to himself, attempted to persuade the Court that the witnesses could still have seen Tornados rather than the F15s. He even suggested that the route flown by the Tornados (which was supplied by the pilots of the Tornados as an exhibit map in evidence) could have been 5 or 6 kms to the north of what the pilots had stated. Craig looked incredulous at this suggestion and firmly rebutted it.
The Prosecution’s next thread concerned the Bite 21 request to descend to “your Min Vectoring Altitude” (a USAF term not understood by RAF controllers) and the advice to descend to 4000 ft (RPS) by Leuchars. His purpose was to suggest to the Court that this was unsafe advice (as it was below the 100 mile Safe Alt of 6500’) and as a result of this Bite 21 descended in IMC and impacted directly into high ground, in close formation, to the SE of Ben McDui at 4058 ft amsl. It was pointed out by Craig that if the aircraft had levelled at a cockpit indicated altitude of 4000 ft (RPS) as advised by Leuchars, they would have overflown the crash site by some 300 ft and passed to the east of the summit of Ben McDui. He also stated that, if errors are made by air traffic controllers in such circumstances, it is still the responsibility of the pilot to maintain and monitor terrain clearance.
The Prosecutor suggested that the radar track information could indicate support of their case that the aircraft had followed a straight line descent into high ground. Craig countered that this could only be correct if all other evidence (eyewitness, rates of descent, weather etc) were discounted.
The Prosecutor, in trying to establish his view of the cause of the accident then tried to take the various elements of evidence that countered this view, one by one, in isolation. He suggested, for instance, that supposing there were no eyewitnesses then his (the Prosecutor’s) theory was credible. Craig countered that this was not so because he would still have to take into account all of the other elements (weather, rate of descent, planned INS track etc). He persisted in this line of attack and Craig continued to counter it.
The Prosecution, having failed to get Craig to concur with the Crown theory as to the cause of the accident then moved on to attack Craig’s own theory. In summary, this was that the aircraft had let down visually beneath 4000 ft (RPS) and entered their low level phase in the Lairig Ghru, a steep-sided valley that runs in a NW direction towards Aviemore and passes just to the west of Ben McDui. At some point they encountered bad weather and they decided to circumvent the weather and circle back around Ben McDui at low level to regain their original track. To accomplish this, they would have continued to fly at low level using valleys to regain position. Craig said the leader would have been working hard at this point. Because, their exact route is not known until sighted by eyewitnesses, it was hard to estimate the time taken. A best guess was 3 to 5 minutes. Knowing that the Lairig Ghru was probably still blocked with weather he would be looking for another escape route to the north. Several valleys to the east of Ben McDui would have presented such opportunities. It was on the westerly heading that they were sighted by several eyewitnesses, some of them seeing the aircraft at extremely close range. The aircraft were positively identified as having twin tails. Craig assumed that the aircraft turned onto a track towards the crash site, possibly seeing an apparent route to the north which might have been a visual illusion or entered a whiteout leading to disorientation and impact with high ground. The Prosecution suggested that without eyewitnesses Craig’s theory wasn’t credible. Craig replied that all evidence should be considered when coming to a conclusion. He restated the main elements of evidence that drew him to his conclusion:
1. Rate of descent greater that would be expected for a close formation in IMC (4000 ft per min.).
2. The radio call of “that looks good, put engine heat on” could be interpreted as them being happy with the situation and that they were gong to continue with their mission to low level.
3. A radar plot that pointed to the west of Ben McDui (in line with their pre-planned way-points).
4. Craig would not have expected an experienced pilot to continue a high rate of descent in IMC knowing that they were in the vicinity of pre-briefed dominant obstacles (Ben McDui by altitude but not necessarily by name).
5. Eyewitness accounts of F15 aircraft seen in an area other than that indicated by that given by the radar plot.
Once again, the Prosecutor pushed his point suggesting that the aircraft flew into the terrain because they did what was suggested by ATC i.e. descend to 4000 ft RPS. Craig, once again, rebuffed this suggestion.
The Prosecutor continued his questioning under a different tack and I must admit I missed the exact phrasing of the Prosecution question that got Mike Jones QC to his feet to ask for a ruling on a point of law. However, it seems that he had been waiting for the Prosecutor to fall into a trap. We have had several of these rulings over the last three weeks but this one was particularly significant. The Board retired while the JA considered the submission.
The charges against Spot are based on Causation (the most serious) and Negligence. On the Causation Charge (under Section 49 of the RAF Act) Spot is charged on two counts (mirror charges relating to the two individual pilots) of committing an act summarised in the followng phrase from the charge sheet ‘which act caused the loss of life’. It appears that these charges could have included the underlined phrase ‘which act caused the loss of life or is likely to have caused the loss of life”. This was not the case in the charges made against Spot.
I believe the Defence objected to a Prosecution question that intimated an act that was “likely to have caused” the deaths of the pilots as this was not in the framework of the charges.
The JA ruled in favour of the Defence, stating that the cause of the accident must be a “direct cause”. Furthermore, the cause must be proven beyond reasonable doubt and it must not be a “trifling cause”.
We assume the JA will direct the Board on his ruling in private session.
It seems to me, that for these 2 charges to be proven, the Board will have to discount all of Craig’s theories and the eyewitness accounts. Hmmmmmm !!
On resumption, the Prosecutor continued his cross-examination of Craig as to how the aircraft could have routed round Ben McDui to reach the impact point.
Craig was still under cross-examination on conclusion of proceedings for the day.
The Court Martial continues on Monday. More information will follow on Monday evening courtesy of the very kind people at Friendly Computers, Helensburgh, who are allowing us to use their facilities for free.
Dick Doleman and Brian Young