Report is
here - English version in the Addenda, starting page 107.
Not a particularly impressive investigation by the look of it. The recommendations made appear to miss some obvious holes in the cheese whilst the majority seem to have a bit of a scatter gun appearance focusing on the use of 121.5.
Although the thread has drifted off the specific incident a little, there are one or two simple facts. In Europe, landing without a clearance falls fairly clearly within the scope of mandatory reporting. And, as we all know, reporting is done with the objective of improving safety - not apportioning blame.
Forgetting to get a landing clearance can happen. When I was controlling there were occasions when I thought I'd given the landing clearance and the pilot called to confirm as the aircraft came over the fence - and I'd confirm the clearance, but wonder to myself whether I'd actually transmitted the clearance. It happens, we're human. And incidents like this can help us all to develop SOPs or our own little
aide-memoires to help overcome our human weaknesses.
The thing that puzzles me is why (or how) two controllers appear not to have been monitoring their traffic to the extent that neither seems to have had the situational awareness to spot that a fairly fundamental part of their job was actually happening.