Wednesday update
Thanks Pprune Radar - sorry it's late but it's taken me some time to get on line. The following has been dispatched by the guys up North, so here goes:
SUMMARY FOR WEDNESDAY 12 FEB 03
Craig Penrice (test pilot) resumed as an expert witness for the Defence under the examination of Mike Jones QC.
It was elicited from documentary evidence already exhibited in court that the risk assessment both in terms of the Daily Ops Assessment and the Flight Leader Assessment were both low. The two pilots were well rested and had allowed good time for the flight preparation. They were carrying the correct scale of map for low level navigation. The pilots would have been assisted in their navigation by:
1. Bearing and distance from their planned way-points on displays in their cockpits (INS).
2. TACAN at the higher altitudes (no good low level).
3. 1:500,000 properly marked low level map.
The briefing would have covered the low level portion of flight and included specific emphasis on dominant obstacles, obstacle avoidance, significant topographical features etc. Although not by name itself, Ben McDui would have been mentioned as it was very close to planned track.
The weather in the area of intended low level flying looked adequate for the purpose.
The mission planning data in the form of way-points showed that the planned route was to take the aircraft about three miles west of Ben McDui towards the next way-point at Aviemore. This would have been along a steep sided valley named the Lairig Ghru. The track plotted from the ATC radars confirmed this track. However, since the Board of Inquiry could not reconcile the last known position of the aircraft with any manoeuvre that would have taken them directly to the known crash site, they decided to move the line to fit the conclusion!!! Bear in mind that the RAF Board of Inquiry never interviewed any eye-witnesses.
The weather at Aviemore (some 9 miles north of Ben McDui) had been introduced into evidence giving good visibility and 3/8 cloud. Craig Penrice was asked if he thought this weather pattern would have been the same if approaching from the south. He said it would, that there would be showers around and probably cloud on the hills. He said that there was a good chance that the pilots would see Aviemore from top of descent (FL80) at range of 20 nms or at least see a topographical feature such as Lairig Ghru (steep sided valley).
Asked for his interpretation of “that looks good, put engine heat on” (from the radio transcript), Craig opined that the first part could mean “we have a good chance of getting on with the mission” – i.e. low level flying. As to the second part, the crews were selecting anti icing on as a precaution against flying through precipitation or icing conditions.
In Craig’s opinion, Bite 21 would be seeing nothing worse in weather than they had expected from the out-brief. He did not concur with the Prosecution theory of a maintained descent in IMC into the mountain.
It was restated from previous evidence, that if Bite 21 was maintaining 4000 ft on Regional Pressure Setting, then their actual altitude would have been 4300 ft amsl and therefore could have not have impacted terrain at 4058 ft. Craig also stated he disagreed with the Prosecution theory on aircraft track – the moving line!
We then moved to Craig’s assessment of the eye witness accounts. It was an agreed fact that the only other aircraft in LFA 14 in the vicinity of Ben McDui at anywhere near the time of the incident were two Tornados. To have seen the Tornados, it was established that all the eyewitnesses would have to have been looking well to the south. All eyewitnesses saw aircraft (twin-tailed) either fly overhead or to the north of their vantage points.
Craig was asked how the aircraft had arrived at the impact point taking all the evidence into account, including eye witnesses and the information from ATC radars. In his opinion the aircraft had seen and entered the valley called the Lairig Ghru to the west of Ben McDui. The weather may have deteriorated ahead of them necessitating a change of plan. The first choice would have been to avoid the weather and find an area that was suitable to continue the mission, rather than climb. The aircraft would have turned east around the back (north) of Ben McDui and then turned south to the east of Ben McDui. They would then have then turned west to try and resume their low level sortie. It was at this point that the eyewitnesses saw them. Craig reminded the court that, during this phase of the flight, the leader would be working very hard and looking for a suitable route to the north again.
There were a number of routes available to the leader but he knew that the Lairig Ghru was not an option, so he selected the next valley to the east of the Lairig Ghru and turned the formation north onto a track that took them to the impact point south east of Ben McDui.
Craig explained that what appears to be a clear way through can sometimes be a visual illusion. White-out is a classic example of such an illusion and it was known that such conditions surrounded Ben McDui.
Craig concluded by saying that he did not view the Prosecution’s account of the accident to be credible. They had not taken account of the eyewitnesses available to them and had not believed the radar information given to them.
Craig was still on the witness stand when proceedings concluded for the day.
Dick Doleman and Brian Young.
That's it, more tomorrow
MickyD