sargs
Thanks for filling in detail. Yes, I'm an engineer and try not to encroach! Our main concern at the time was the astronomical cost of supporting radars for a 20 (?) aircraft SAR Mk3 fleet. It should have been a 5 minutes, once a fortnight task, but was eating up time and budget. It was an obvious question. Why did the RN need fewer radars and funding for 82 ASW aircraft, with a more expensive/complex radar? Forgive me, but the attitude in the RAF at the time was, we've 180 radars to play with, so what if we change them daily. The LTC line was constructed as "Sea King Radar", which meant there was a knock-on effect on the RN if 20% of the aircraft consumed 80% of the funding.
If I remember correctly, the radar was (more) easily viewed in an RN aircraft, but the RAF had their curtain (for want of the correct term)
No names, and I can't recall anyway, but the Finningley man was the Instructor, a Sqn Ldr. He was very supportive and quite annoyed at the lack of training HE had received. The rig was delivered from Daedalus as they had 4 and no longer needed them. (I do recall their instructor - Paddy). It was quite a basic failure. A 2nd Line workshop was constrained to a Depth A maintenance policy through lack of training.
Don't let this obscure the main (dis)organisational problem. It should have been the RAF support people (AMSO) who made provision for proper training, rigs, pubs etc; and prevented the waste in the first place. The SAR bosses (perhaps still in Empress State at the time?) were tearing their hair out. So, one part of the RAF was ignoring another. At a more senior level (1 Star) the problem only became apparent when SAR readiness plummeted due to lack of radars.
I'm trying not to have a pop at the RAF. At the time (post-formation of ASE), solving such problems in the RN quite clearly fell to the MoD(PE) project manager (in this case there was an IPT covering fire control and surveillance radars) and the RN had a single point of contact for all problems. That postholder was selected for his background. But the RAF remained fragmented and it was impossible to tie down anyone on each component. AEDIT (?) at Finningley were astonished someone from what was basically an RN-orientated IPT, with total authority, could just pitch up and crack the problem without being asked (and that is the biggest indictment). The later IPT model (1999) couldn't do that, being constrained by personnel policy, lack of delegated powers and stove-piping.
Interesting difference of opinion over the blind arc, which serves to highlight the difficulty OR had. My main point was the arc could have been halved in the Mk3A at less cost, with minimal cost for Mk3 retrofit; as no radar equipment had to be bought and there would have been huge support and training benefits through commonality.